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Abstract 
Globalization and rising wage inequality has been a world’s reality since the 1970s and a 
reasonable amount of studies have dealt with this topic. Although wage inequality has 
been prevalent and acute in emerging economies (EEs), which have been important 
recipients of foreign direct investment (FDI), the empirical evidence on the impact of FDI 
on wage inequality in EEs is scarce and usually focused on given countries in isolation.  
The present study aims at contributing to fill in this gap by analysing the impact of FDI, 
proxied by FDI inward flows and FDI stocks, on wage inequality, proxied by the Gini 
coefficient, the S90-S10 ratio, the S80-S20 ratio and the Industrial Pay Inequality index 
(UTIP-UNIDO index), on EEs resorting to fixed-effect panel data comprising 39 EEs 
over a period of 45 years (1970-2015), controlling for countries’ openness to trade, 
economy dimension, human capital and corruption. 
Globally, our empirical study suggests that FDI increases inequality in EEs, at a 
decreasing rate over time, with its impact being larger on wages than on income. 
Notwithstanding, we found that in the last two decades FDI reduced the gap between 
higher and lowest income earners. We further found that the impact also varies according 
to the country development level: 1) FDI reduces wage inequality (proxied by the Gini 
coefficient) in low-income countries and increases it in high income; 2) FDI increases 
wage inequality (proxied by the Industrial Pay Inequality index) in all groups of incomes, 
with higher effect on higher income countries. 
 
Keywords: globalization; foreign direct investment; wage inequality; inequality; 
emerging economies 
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Resumo 
O crescimento da desigualdade num contexto de globalização é uma realidade desde a 
década de 1970 e um número considerável de estudos tem tentado explicar este fenómeno. 
Não obstante a desigualdade salarial ser frequente e elevada nas Economias Emergentes 
(EEs), e sendo estas importantes recetores de investimento direto estrangeiro (IDE), os 
estudos sobre a relação do IDE com a desigualdade salarial são ainda escassos e focados, 
usualmente, num único país. 
Este estudo pretende suprir esta falha da literatura analisando o impacto do IDE, medido 
pelos influxos e stocks de IDE, na desigualdade salarial, medida através de quatro 
indicadores diferentes - coeficiente de Gini, o rácio S90-S10, o rácio S80-S20 e o índice 
de Desigualdade de Salários Industriais (índice UTIP-UNIDO) - via estimação de 
modelos em painel de efeitos fixos, com base em 39 EEs ao longo dos últimos 45 anos 
(1970-2015) e controlando para o feito do grau de abertura dos países, a dimensão da 
economia, o capital humano e a corrupção. 
Os resultados sugerem que, em geral, o IDE aumenta a desigualdade a uma taxa 
decrescente ao longo do tempo, tendo um impacto superior ao nível da desigualdade de 
salários do que de rendimentos. O impacto varia também de acordo com o nível de 
rendimentos do país, sendo que o IDE reduz a desigualdade de rendimentos, medida 
através do coeficiente de Gini, nos países com baixos rendimentos e aumenta a 
desigualdade salarial nos países com níveis de rendimentos mais elevados. O IDE 
aumenta a desigualdade salarial, medida através do índice de desigualdade de salários 
industriais, em todos os níveis de rendimentos dos países, sendo o efeito superior nos 
países de nível de rendimentos mais elevado. 
 
Palavras-chave: globalização; investimento direto estrangeiro; desigualdade salarial; 
economias emergentes 
Códigos JEL: F21; F62; D63   
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1. Introduction 
Globalization and trade liberalization are important factors for countries’ economic 
growth (Anwar, 2010; Oladi, Gilbert and Beladi, 2011). According to data from the 
UNCTAD, the world level weight of FDI inflows in gross domestic product (GDP) has 
increased fivefold,1 since 1980 until 2015. So that multinational enterprises (MNEs) have 
become the main players of global economy growth (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). 
Additionally, exports grew, in 1986 relatively to 2013, from around 2,5 trillion US dollars 
to 23,3 trillion US dollars (UNCTAD).2  
In the late 1970s, the study of the globalization’s impact on societies’ wellbeing became 
relevant with the observation of the deterioration of the position of unskilled labour and 
the rise of the wage gap between qualified/skilled and unqualified/unskilled workers in 
the US and an unemployment phenomenon of unskilled workers in Europe caused by 
several moves of trade liberalization and the appearance of newly industrializing 
countries (Pflüger, Blien, Möller and Moritz, 2013).  
Since then a vast number of empirical studies (e.g., Chen, Ge and Lai, 2011; Nakamura, 
2013; Zulfiu-Alili, 2014; Lee and Wie, 2015) evidence that FDI has led to an increase in 
wage inequality. One explanation behind this fact is that MNEs tend to pay a wage 
premium to skilled labor, which accentuates the wage gap in the host countries (see 
Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey, 1996; Feenstra and Hanson, 1997; Figini and Gorg, 2011; 
Hijzen, Martins, Schank and Upward, 2013; Autor, 2014). Other factors such as 
technology (Lee and Wie, 2015), public infrastructure (Pi and Zhou, 2014), and labour 
market characteristics (Kijima, 2006) might also influence the impact of FDI on wage 
inequality.  
The empirical research on this subject has proven that international trade and FDI have 
influenced rising wage inequality in about 20% and, although globalization has led to 
economic growth, the individual gains from this might be small (WTO, 2008). Despite 
this fact, Helpman (2016) believes that, after reviewing the literature, globalization is not 
the primarily responsible for wage inequality, explaining only a small part of this 
phenomenon. 
                                                 
1 In UNCTAD Statistics - http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=96740 
, accessed on 8th January of 2017. 
2 Idem footnote 1. 
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However, according to Gopinath and Chen (2003) and Figini and Gorg (2011), the effect 
of FDI on wage inequality varies depending on the countries’ development level. 
Specifically, for a developed country, FDI tends to lead to a decrease in wage inequality, 
whereas for a developing country, FDI usually widens the gap between the wages of 
skilled and unskilled workers. 
The debate on the impact of FDI on wage inequality, albeit relevant for all types of 
economies, it is particularly pressing in the case of the so-called Emerging Economies 
(EEs). They are a quite important group of countries that, on aggregate, involve “about 
one fifth of global GDP and close to half the world’s population” (OECD, 2011: 48). FDI 
is one of the largest components of EEs net capital inflows explained, to a large extent, 
by MNEs strategies to take advantage of these countries’ relative low labour costs (Te 
Velde, 2006), taxation benefits, market size and others (Groh and Wich, 2012). EEs have 
consistently evidence relative high economic growth rates in the last decades but such 
growth has been accompanied with high (and, in some case, increasing) levels of income 
inequality (OECD, 2011). 
Notwithstanding such situation, the extant evidence on the impact of FDI on wage 
inequality has overlooked EEs’ heterogeneity, focusing on analysing individual countries, 
namely China (Chen et al., 2011), Indonesia (Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2004), and Mexico 
(Feenstra and Hanson, 1997), or a restricted geographical group of countries such as East 
Asian countries (Te Velde and Morrissey, 2004), which includes developed, emerging 
and developing economies, or performed a comparison between developed to developing 
countries, such as the study by Hijzen et al. (2013), which included Germany, Portugal 
and UK vis-à-vis Brazil and Indonesia.  
Given the recognized heterogeneity of EEs (see Saccone, 2017), it is scientifically 
pertinent to uncover, for all the EEs, and among these, poorer and richer EEs, how FDI 
has impacted these countries’ wage gap. To perform such analysis, in the present 
dissertation, and in line with similar studies, we resort to panel data econometric models, 
involving 39 EEs (as categorized by Saccone, 2017),3 over the last two decades, 1996-
                                                 
3 List of EEs: Albania; Angola; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Belarus; Bulgaria; Cambodia; Chile; 
China; Colombia; Dominican Republic; Ethiopia; Ghana; India; Indonesia; Kazakhstan; Latvia; Lithuania; 
Morocco; Mozambique; Myanmar; Nigeria; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Romania; Serbia; Montenegro; Sri 
Lanka; Thailand; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Uganda; U. R. Tanzania; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Vietnam; Zambia 
[Note: three of the five BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) are excluded from this list: 
Brazil and South Africa given their too low growth rates, and Russia because of a level of per capita income 
slightly above the full sample mean]. Saccone (2017) considers the country Serbia and Montenegro, 
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2015. The model specification regresses wage inequality to FDI, controlling for other 
relevant wage inequality determinants that are usually referred in literature, such as level 
of economic development, degree of trade openness, human capital and corruption. We 
estimate the data through a fixed-effect panel and for the four different inequality 
measures (Gini coefficient, S90-S10 and S80-S20 ratios and Industrial Pay Inequality 
index) and separately for FDI inward flows and FDI stocks. Estimations were made 
separately by periods of time, countries’ income level and world regions. 
In terms of organization, the present dissertation is structured as follows. In the next 
section (Section 2) we do a thorough overview of the theories that relate FDI (or the 
globalization phenomenon) to wage inequality, perform a bibliometric analysis and an 
analysis of other relevant variables that can explain wage inequality. Section 3 explains 
describes the methodological approach and describes all variables used in the model. In 
Section 4, we analyse the empirical results of our panel. Finally, in Section 5 we describe 
and debate the main contributions and limitations of this dissertation proposal, as well as 
possible policy implications for the EEs. 
  
                                                 
although they became two separate countries in 2006. Due to data availability, we will consider them two 
separate countries. 
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2. Literature on foreign direct investment and wage inequality 
2.1. Defining the main concepts 
2.1.1. Wage inequality 
Wage inequality is considered the wage differential between two or more groups of 
workers, as well as the distribution of wages within a group. It is usually measured as the 
difference of wages (or the ration) between skilled and non-skilled workers (see Lipsey 
and Sjoholm, 2004; Girma and Gorg, 2007; Chen et al., 2011; Zulfiu-Alili, 2014). This 
phenomenon can also be described as college wage premium and measured by the 
percentage of extra wage a college graduate earns when compared to a high school 
graduate (Helpman, 2016). 
For assessing wage inequality between skilled and non-skilled workers, the extant 
empirical literature considers distinct groups or categories for proxying the skilled and 
non-skilled (WTO, 2008): production versus non-production workers (Girma and Gorg, 
2007); manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors (Anwar and Sun, 2012); unskilled 
jobs (e.g., farmers, shermans, unskilled manual workers) versus all other jobs (Zulfiu-
Alili, 2014); blue-collar versus white-collar workers (Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2004); and top 
versus low wage earners (Kijima, 2006).  
The type of income considered as ‘wages’ also varies considerably: wage and non-wage 
compensations (Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2004; Chen et al., 2011); total annual cash 
employment income (Tomohara and Yokota, 2011; Nakamura, 2013); or annual wage 
without compensations (Heyman, Sjoholm and Tingvall, 2007). 
At the country level, there are very few indicators of inequality using wages as their 
source data. The broadest indicator purely of wage inequality is the UTIP-UNIDO dataset 
of industrial pay inequality, hereafter called the Industrial Pay Inequality (IPI) index. This 
index is a Theil’s T-statistic comparison of between countries and years industrial sector 
wages, which are available in the UNIDO dataset (Galbraith, Halbach, Malinowska, 
Shams and Zhang, 2015). The Theil’s T-statistic method (Conceição and Ferreira, 2000) 
allow us to compare between and within groups inequality by measuring the discrepancy 
in the distribution of income and of individuals between groups. If a group has equal share 
of income as it as share of income, it is not included has it does not contribute to inequality 
Other income inequality indicators, such as the Gini index, the S90-S10 Ratio and the 
S80-S20 Ratio are used as a proxy for wage inequality (e.g. Figini and Gorg, 2011) 
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because they are based on household income, which includes wages (one of the main 
sources of income of families) and other forms of income, such as self-employment 
revenue sources, public cash transfers and capital income, deducted from taxes and social 
security (OECD, 2011). 
The most often used is the Gini index (see Figini and Gorg, 2011; OECD, 2011). The 
Gini index is a measure of statistical dispersion that “gives more detailed information on 
the entire income distribution of households in an economy and considers the fact that an 
individual household may have several sources of income” (WTO, 2008: 127). It ranges 
between 0 (equal income/wealth distribution) and 1 (extreme unequal distribution). It is 
also used in a coefficient form, ranging the values from 0% (perfect equality) to 100% 
(perfect inequality). 
Other inequality measures are the S90-S10 ratio and the S80-S20 ratio (or 20/20 ratio). 
The S90-S10 ratio (OECD, 2011) is the ratio of the average income of the richest 10% 
individuals to the average income of the poorest 10%: the higher the ratio, the higher the 
level of income inequality. The S80-S20 ratio (OECD, 2011, 2015) is the ratio of the 
average income of the richest 20% of the population to the average income of the poorest 
20%, following the same logic as the S90-S10 ratio.  
The Gini coefficient, the form of the Gini index we are using later in our model, basically 
gives us the degree of distribution of a country income by its population. The S90-S10 
ratio (S80-S20 ratio), gives us a percentage of how much more or less income the top 
10%(20%) income earners receive on average when compared to the lower 10%(20%) 
income earners. Example: a S90-S10 ratio of 10 means that the top 10% income earners 
receive on average 10 times what the low 10% income earners receive on average.4 
 
2.1.2. Foreign direct investment 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is defined by UNCTAD has a lasting investment made 
by one entity in an entity outside the residence of the investor. To be considered a lasting 
investment, the investor should own at least 10% of ordinary shares or voting power of 
the entity it is investing in. It relates to all transactions between the two entities and it 
relates to equity capital, reinvested earnings and intra-company loans. 
                                                 
4 There are other inequality measures, such as the Atkinson’s index, the Hoover index and the Palma ratio 
(Afonso, LaFleur and Alarcón, 2015), but they will not be used on this study, so we will not get in details. 
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FDI can be measured as flows (inward or outward) or as stocks. FDI inward flows are the 
amount invested in a year by foreign entities per year in a country and FDI outward flows, 
on the contrary, are the amount invested in a year by resident entities of a country in other 
entities residing in other countries. Both flows of FDI are available in UNCTAD data 
centre since 1970. FDI stocks are estimated since 1980 by UNCTAD and reflect the 
current level of direct investment made by non-residents in each country. As Wacker 
(2016: 5) describes “FDI stocks are the (revalued) accumulation of past flows, while 
flows are the current transactions taking place in a certain period t, most importantly 
within a year”. 
There are two main types of empirical approaches when studying FDI related topic: some 
studies (e.g. Aitken et al., 1996; Feenstra and Hanson, 1997; Heyman et al., 2007) use 
micro and meso-level data, focusing on foreign ownership of companies rather than 
aggregate capital flows; other studies (e.g., Figini and Gorg, 2011; Dreher and Gaston, 
2008) use macro-level data by using flows or stocks of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). 
When using the micro and meso-level data approach, FDI is seen as the ownership status 
of an enterprise, being mainly based on information provided by direct surveys. In this 
type of studies, the percentage threshold that defines a foreign firm depends from the 
study and countries in question. For instance, Aitken et al. (1996), which analysed the 
US, Venezuela and Mexico, use, for each country, a distinct threshold of foreign 
ownership: for the US, they considered foreign MNEs those firms with 10% or more of 
foreign capital, whereas for Venezuela and Mexico they consider foreign MNEs those 
firms that have any share of foreign ownership. Heyman et al. (2007) consider a foreign-
owned MNEs those companies that have more than 50% of foreign ownership. In the case 
of Nakamura (2013), which analysed both inward and outward FDI in Japan, it is 
considered two thresholds for foreign ownership: 20% and 50%. 
 
2.2. Main theoretical approaches explaining the relation between FDI and wage 
inequality 
In scientific literature, it is of our understanding that there is a blur line when analysing 
the impact of globalization on inequality. Both international trade (exports and imports) 
and/or FDI are used to measure this phenomenon, being trade commonly used in 
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theoretical studies and both indicators of globalization used in empirical studies 
(separately or combined).  
Globalization theory has come a long way from the David Ricardo’s theory of 
comparative advantages, which compares the relative cost of goods between two 
countries in autarky (WTO, 2008). In 1933, Heckscher and Ohlin developed the relative 
advantage theory which compared international trade between two countries, two 
products and two factors (labor and capital). In this theory “a country exports those goods 
whose production is intensive the country’s relatively abundant factor and imports other 
goods that use intensively the country’s relatively scarce factor” (Blaug, 1992:185). 
Afterwards, Stolper and Samuelson (1941) developed a corollary to this theory, important 
later on in the study of wage inequality, in which two countries trade and when the price 
of low-skill-intensive product increases, there is an increase in real wages of low-skill 
workers in the country that is abundant in low-skilled labour and decreases the real wages 
of the high-skilled workers, decreasing wage inequality in this country. If the price of the 
low-skilled intensive product declines, real wages of low-skilled workers decrease and 
real wages of high-skill workers increase, increasing wage inequality. The changes in 
prices can depend on trade costs.  
Although the Stolper and Samuelson’s (1941) HO corollary, was the basis for the study 
of the impact of international trade (IT)/foreign direct investment (FDI) on wages, many 
authors, including Pflüger et al. (2013) and Helpman (2016), assert that this theorem is 
not sufficient in explaining the ever-growing complexity of international trade, as its 
results were not matching the empirical evidence. According to these authors, the 
Heckscher–Ohlin theorem is too simple for explaining the relation between trade and 
factor endowment/prices. To match empirical evidence, these authors argue that it is 
necessary to put forward other factors and assumptions. 
In this vein, many theoretical approaches were developed aiming at studying how other 
factors could explain the impact of globalization (including international trade (IT) and 
FDI) on societies’ well-being, namely on the wage gap variations.  
The main theories are summarized in Table 1 and include: the location theory (Krugman, 
1991); the technology approach (e.g., Katz and Murphy, 1992; Feenstra and Hanson, 
1996, 1997; Leamer, 2000; Krugman, 2000; Autor et al., 2003, 2006; Grossman and 
Rossi-Hansberg, 2006, 2008, 2012); assortative matching approach (Becker, 1973); 
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firms’ heterogeneity approach (Melitz, 2003; Bernard, Redding and Schott, 2007); labor 
market frictions approach (Diamond, 1982a,b; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994); 
observable attributes approach (Antràs, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006; Costinot 
and Vogel, 2010; Sampson, 2014; Grossman and Helpman, 2014); observable attributes 
and technology choice approach (Yeaple, 2005; Bustos, 2011); and the residual inequality 
approach (Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding, 2010; Amiti and Davis, 2012). 
 
Table 1: Summary of theoretical approaches to the relation between globalization and wage inequality 
 
Authors (year) Argument 
Expected relation between 
International Trade (IT)/FDI 
and Wage Inequality (WI) 
Mechanism through 
which FDI impacts 
on wage inequality 
T
ra
d
it
io
n
a
l 
T
h
eo
ry
 
Stolper and 
Samuelson 
(1941) 
Heckscher–Ohlin’s Stolper Samuelson Theorem 
When a country is specialized in low-skill-intensive 
products, international trade will decrease the price 
of its products as well as the wages of low-skilled 
workers. 
IT  WI 
[if there is a decrease in the 
price of low-skill-intensive 
product] 
Product prices 
IT   WI 
[if there is an increase in the 
price of low-skill-intensive 
product] 
L
o
c
a
ti
o
n
 
Krugman 
(1991) 
Core-Periphery Model 
Regional model that attempts to understand why 
firms locate close to each other regarding the 
following factors: economies of scale (demand and 
fixed-costs) and transportations costs. 
IT   WI 
[Low TC/MS is high ES are 
strong] 
Transport costs 
(TC), economies of 
scale (ES), shares of 
manufacturing (SM) 
IT   WI  
[High TC; ES are weak or SM 
is low] 
T
e
c
h
n
o
lo
g
y
 
Katz and 
Murphy (1992) 
Factor content analysis is used to analyse and 
compare in different countries the additional factor 
endowment created by trade thus analysing the 
changes in labour demand 
IT  WI 
Skill-biased 
technology shift 
Feenstra and 
Hanson 
(1996,1997) 
Developed countries, relatively specialized in 
skilled labour, outsource to the developing 
countries, relatively specialized in unskilled labour, 
unskilled labour activities, though they are 
considered skilled labour activities in the 
developing perspective. 
IT  WI 
Leamer (2000) 
Wages of skilled workers will grow at the pace of 
technology (maintaining wages per effective unit) 
and wages of low-skilled workers won’t be 
affected. 
No effect 
Krugman 
(2000) 
Direct effect on wages: Leamer’s analysis; Indirect 
effect on wages: changes in prices due to supply 
shifts. 
IT  WI 
Autor, Levy and 
Murnane 
(2003); Autor, 
Katz and 
Kearney (2006) 
Polarization Hypothesis 
It studies the impact of computerization on skills 
demand. Accessible computerization costs tend to 
have two effects on labour market: (1) substitute 
tasks of unskilled labour, reducing their demand 
and consequently their wages; (2) complement 
skilled-labour tasks, increase their demand and 
their wages. There is also an indirect impact of 
international trade sustained by the development of 
information technology, increasing international 
fragmentation of production. 
IT WI 
Grossman and 
Rossi-Hansberg 
(2006, 2008) 
Defends that the decision of a MNE to offshore a 
low-skill or high-skill activity of production is 
based on the minimization of costs. Workers, 
which tasks are relocated, managed to see their real 
wages increase due to productivity gains that result 
from the relocation of tasks. 
IT/FDI WI 
Grossman and 
Rossi-Hansberg 
(2012) 
Studies trade of tasks in developed countries that 
have similar comparative advantages but 
differentiate in size: North’s bigger country will 
specialize in tasks that are costlier to offshore and 
North’s smaller country will specialize is tasks that 
are cheap to offshore.  
IT/FDI  WI 
[if countries are very different 
in size] 
9 
(…) 
 Authors 
(year) 
Argument 
Expected relation between 
International Trade 
(IT)/FDI and Wage 
Inequality (WI) 
Mechanism 
through which 
FDI impacts on 
wage 
inequality 
A
ss
o
r
ta
ti
v
e
 
M
a
tc
h
in
g
 
Becker 
(1973); 
Helpman 
(2016 
Positive Assortative Matching (PAM) 
Higher (lower) skilled workers are matched with firms 
with more (less) technology and wage inequality depends 
on the impact of globalization in assortative matching. 
IT/FDI  WI 
[if globalization creates 
efficiency in labour market] Labour market 
effects IT/FDI  WI 
[if globalization creates 
inefficiency in labour market 
F
ir
m
s’
 h
et
er
o
g
en
ei
ty
 
Melitz (2003) 
Studies the impact in exporters and non-exporters firms. 
When entering a market, firms differ in productivity and 
only highly productive firms survive and low-productive 
firms leave. Workers have same salary independently of 
firms’ productivity. 
No effect 
Worker’s 
homogeneity 
[all workers are 
paid equal] 
Bernard, 
Jensen, 
Redding and 
Scholl (2007) 
This model, based on Melitz’s model, implies that each 
country will specialize in industries that have comparative 
advantages towards the factor that is relatively more 
abundant. 
An increase in price of the factor that is abundant will 
increase productivity and consequently wages of all 
industries, through efficient allocation of factors. 
Reduced positive impact or 
even no effect 
Factor prices 
L
a
b
o
u
r
 
m
a
r
k
e
t 
fr
ic
ti
o
n
s 
Diamond 
(1982a, b); 
Mortensen 
and Pissarides 
(1994)  
Job openings and workers are matched depending on the 
characteristics of the labour market. IT modifies choices 
of workers and firms. 
Depends on how 
globalization affects the 
labour market. 
Labour market 
frictions 
O
b
se
rv
a
b
le
 a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
Antràs, 
Garicano and 
Rossi-
Hansberg 
(2006) 
There is a managerial hierarchy and workers are matched 
to managers due to complementarity between skills. There 
is a PAM between them. Open trade will make developing 
countries’ higher-skilled managers and workers to be 
employed by developed countries’ firms. 
IT/FDI  WI 
[for workers in high-skill 
intensive countries] Distribution of 
skills  IT/FDI  WI 
[for managers in low-skill 
intensive countries] 
Costinot and 
Vogel (2010) 
Sectors produce intermediate inputs that are traded 
internationally for countries to produce final consumer 
goods. Workers differ in skill levels and sectors differ in 
technological sophistication, so high-skill workers are 
matched with more sophisticated sectors and low-skill 
workers are matched with less sophisticated sectors across 
countries. 
IT  WI 
[in countries more abundant 
in high-skill workers] 
Factor 
endowment IT WI 
[in countries more abundant 
in low-skill workers] 
Sampson 
(2014) 
Firm’s productivity depends on technology, worker’s 
abilities and degree of trade openness. So, exporters tend 
to be more productive and hire high-skill workers and 
non-exporters are less productive and hire low-skill 
workers. The higher the export fixed costs are, the higher 
is the rightward distribution of technology and 
consequently wage inequality. 
IT  WI 
Distribution of 
technology 
Grossman 
and Helpman 
(2014) 
Low-skill workers are hired by manufacturing firms 
(produce intermediate inputs) and high-skill workers are 
hired by innovating firms (research new intermediate 
inputs to be produced). There is PAM between workers 
and firms. Links globalization with increasing countries’ 
growth. 
IT  WI R&D spillovers 
O
b
se
rv
a
b
le
 a
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
a
n
d
 
te
c
h
n
o
lo
g
y
 c
h
o
ic
e 
Yeaple 
(2005) 
Higher-skilled workers have advantage in the higher 
technology firms of the advanced sector, mid-skilled 
workers have advantage in lower technology firms of the 
advanced sector and low-skill workers have advantage in 
the traditional sector. Globalization leads to the extension 
of the lower technology firms of the advanced sector. 
IT  WI 
Workers’ 
comparative 
advantages 
Bustos (2011) 
There are two types of workers (low-skilled and high-
skilled), two types of firms (exporters and non-exporters) 
and among exporters there two types of technologies 
(large output technology with high fixed costs and low 
output technology with low fixed costs). Large scale firms 
employ higher-skilled workers and low-scale firms and 
domestic-oriented firms hire lower skilled labour. 
IT  WI 
Technology 
costs and trade 
costs 
R
e
si
d
u
a
l 
in
e
q
u
a
li
ty
 Helpman, 
Itshoki, and 
Redding 
(2010) 
Firms’ productivity depends on the productivity of 
workers hired, although firms only know workers 
productive after hiring. More productive firms (exporters) 
have an incentive to keep screening for workers to 
increase firms’ productivity. Bargaining wages will lead 
to increasing wages in exporters firms. 
IT  WI 
Workers’ 
bargaining 
power 
Amiti and 
Davis (2012) 
More productive firms have higher profits and pay higher 
wages. There is a productivity threshold in which firms 
bellow this leave the market. Productivity increases with 
increasing involvement in global markets (imports and/or 
exports). 
IT  WI Trade barriers 
Source: Own elaboration based on Pflüger et al. (2013) and Helpman (2016). 
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The core-periphery model, developed by Krugman (1991), seeks to understand firms’ 
location decisions and their impact on labour prices. The author demonstrated that such 
impact was dependent on transport costs, the share of manufacturing and economies of 
scale: when transportation costs are high, economies of scale are weak or the share of 
manufacturing is low (disperse) firms will locate according to workers’ location. In this 
way, wage inequality will be reduced. In contrast, when transportation costs are low, 
manufacturing share is high and economies of scale are strong, firms tend to concentrate 
in the region in which they have a head start. Thus, wage inequality will increase. In 
accordance to this model, when FDI is attracted to the region where transportation costs 
are high, economies of scale are weak or the share of manufacturing is low, it is expected 
that FDI will reduce wage inequality. When FDI is attracted to the other region, where 
transportation costs are low, manufacturing share is high and economies of scale are 
strong, there will be an increase in wage inequality. 
Within the technology approach, several studies (e.g., Katz and Murphy, 1992; Feenstra 
and Hanson, 1996, 1997; Leamer, 2000; Krugman, 2000; Autor et al., 2003, 2006; 
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006, 2008, 2012) show that the “efficiency of skilled 
labour increased faster than the efficiency of unskilled labour” (Helpman, 2016: 9). This 
will, in general, increase polarization between workers thus increasing wage inequality.  
Through differences in factors endowment in different countries, Katz and Murphy 
(1992) found that trade increased the demand for skilled labour, increasing the wage gap 
between skilled and unskilled. In the North and South model developed by Feenstra and 
Hanson (1996) a developed country specializes in high skill intensive products and 
sources the low-skill intensive tasks to a developing country. The sourcing is financially 
efficient until the point that the developed country stops the production of the low-
intensive products and invest in facilities in the developing country.   Through an 
empirical test of this theory, using the US and Mexico as case studies, Feenstra and 
Hanson (1997) observed that not only wage inequality increased in the developed 
economy (US) but also increased in the developing economy (Mexico), as North 
American FDI in Mexico increased the demand for skilled labour.  
In contrast with all the remaining studies within the technology approach, Leamer (2000) 
defended that there will be no effect on wage inequality because the technological skill-
biased effect will only increase the overall wages of high-skilled labour maintaining the 
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ration of wages per effective unit. This is the case because Leamer’s approach is assuming 
that world prices do not change. Krugman (2000) added to this model the indirect effect 
on wages of changes in prices of the final product which leads to changes in supply of 
these products and increasing wage inequality. 
The impact of computers on skill polarization is studied by Autor et al. (2003) and Autor 
et al. (2006). Accordingly, computers tend to reduce the demand of unskilled labour and 
increase the demand for skilled labour due to its increase in productivity. International 
trade amplifies the productivity effect because it allows the spread of computerization, 
increasing wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers. 
A decrease of wage inequality is expected in the study by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 
(2006, 2008) through which offshoring activities (a form of IT) will create a productivity 
effect in both countries (the one that is offshoring activities and the one producing these 
activities) that will compensate the decrease in wages of the workers whose tasks are 
being relocated. Also in a latter model, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2012: 621) 
demonstrate that a “reduction in offshoring costs induces more task trade and tends to 
improve welfare”. Specifically, in this model larger countries will specialize in 
production of tasks that are costlier to offshore and offshore to smaller countries the 
production of tasks that are cheaper to offshore. Admitting that countries vary in size, 
there are strong external economies of scale or higher elasticities of substitution, 
offshoring will generate a reduction in wage gap through the reduction of offshoring costs 
and increased productivity. 
The above referred skill-biased technology change approaches were found to be 
insufficient to explain the relationship between IT/FDI and wage inequality because they 
fail to take into consideration observable attributes of workers (such as gender, education, 
age, etc.) or firms (technology and consequent productivity levels) in the wage policy of 
firms (Helpman, 2016). 
The positive assortative matching model, developed by Becker (1973), constitutes the 
basis for the observable attributes approach which establishes that higher skilled workers 
are matched with firms that have higher level of technologies and lower skilled workers 
with firms that have lower levels of technology. The effect on wage inequality depend on 
globalization: when globalization is associated with increasing efficiency in the labour 
market, that is, better matching of workers, this will result in a very distinct polarization 
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of skills, and thus increase wage inequality; when globalization entails a not so good 
matching of skills, that is, the possibility that higher skilled workers are matched to lower 
technology firms and vice-versa, wage inequality will be reduced. 
Also, based on Becker’s positive assortative matching model, Melitz (2003) developed a 
model which controlled for observable attributes of firms (namely, productivity). In this 
model workers are homogeneous and wages are equal for all, thus it is not possible to 
analyse wage inequality. Melitz’s model, together with Becker’s positive assortative 
matching model, was, nevertheless, the basis for the next stream of research into wage 
inequality, which took into consideration observable attributes of both workers and firms. 
Through Bernard et al.’s (2007) approach globalization has a narrow positive impact, or 
even none, on wage inequality. Accordingly, an increase in the price of the product that 
is intensive in the factor in which the country is abundant will increase the productivity 
of the production of said product, thus increasing the price of all factors. 
The main labour market frictions and globalization studies were developed by Diamond, 
(1982a, b) and then Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). In their framework, globalization 
creates friction by altering employment opportunities available and choices for firms and 
the impact on wage inequality will depend on how globalization impacts the labour 
market by creating or reducing additional costs of the matching process between workers 
and firms.  
Although skills are important in defining wages, they depend on various individual 
characteristics (education, experience, etc.) (Helpman, 2016). Antràs et al. (2006), 
Costinot and Vogel (2010), Sampson (2014), Grossman and Helpman (2014) developed 
different approaches that seek to explain the matching between both heterogeneous 
workers and firms taking in consideration other firms and workers characteristics. 
In Antràs et al. (2006) the relevant issue is the matching between managers and workers 
and the matching of workers to managers (high-skill workers work for high-skill 
managers and vice-versa). In the presence of globalization, the matching changes the 
redistribution of income between countries depending on the distribution of skills: higher 
skilled workers in low-skill intensive countries are matched with low-ability managers in 
the high skill intensive countries and low-skill workers in low-skill intensive countries 
are matched with high-skilled managers in the same countries. As a result, when 
management consumes little time and the gap in skills is high between countries, 
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globalization increases wage inequality between workers in the high-skill intensive 
countries. Otherwise, it reduces wage inequality for workers in high-skill intensive 
countries. It also reduces inequality between managers in low-skill intensive workers and 
has an ambiguous effect in managers of high-skill intensive workers.  
In the approach by Constinot and Vogel (2010) workers differ in skill levels and sectors 
differ in technology levels. Trade improves the matches of high skilled workers and 
worsens the matches of lower skilled workers in the country with more labour factor 
endowment, increasing wage inequality in this country. The opposite is expected in the 
country with lower factor endowment, in which trade worsens the match of higher skilled 
labour and improves the match of lower skilled labour, thus reducing wage inequality in 
this country.  
The distribution of technology between countries seems to be the mechanism with which 
Sampson (2014) justifies the differences in wage inequality. In this approach firms 
involved in IT (that is, the exporters) tend to have higher levels of technology and 
productivity and hire more skilled workers and firms not involved in IT (the non-
exporters) tend to hire lower skilled workers and wage inequality depends on the 
distribution of technology between firms in a country.  
In Grossman and Helpman (2014), high ability workers are hired by innovative firms and 
low ability workers are hired by manufacturing firms and there is positive assortative 
matching between them. When involved in trade, countries improve R&D levels through 
spillovers from other countries thus reducing the threshold level through which high 
ability workers are matched with innovation sector, the country experiences more growth 
and increasing wage inequality. 
Yeaple (2005) and Bustos (2011) added to the previous approaches the firm’s option for 
the level of technology, explicating distinct mechanisms through which wage inequality 
is impacted by globalization: whereas Yeaple (2005) elects’ workers’ comparative 
advantages, Bustos (2011) put forward technology costs and trade costs. Yeaple (2005) 
theory assumes three different sectors: the traditional sector (not involved in IT), the 
advanced sector with lower technology levels and the advanced sector with higher 
technology levels (both advanced sectors involved in IT) and inequality depends on the 
comparative advantage of workers towards these sectors. Trade increases technology 
levels for all firms in the advanced sector, decreasing the number of firms in the advanced 
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sector with lower technology, thus increasing relative wages in the latter sector and 
reducing relative wages of the advanced sector with lower technology levels. Wages of 
the traditional sector are not affected and this way trade increases wage inequality. 
Bustos (2011) assumes two types of workers (high-skill and low-skill) and two types of 
firm’s technologies (high-fixed-cost and low-fixed-cost). Firms with higher costs of 
technology produce large volumes of output and hire relatively higher skilled workers 
and when the country is involved in free trade they start being exporters. A reduction in 
variable trade costs leads to a market selection of firms in which least productive firms 
have two options: leave the market or employ higher levels of productivity, hiring more 
skilled workers and increasing wage inequality. 
With the development of this theories, some authors saw the necessity of separating wage 
inequality created by workers’ observable attributes (age, education, gender, experience) 
and wage inequality due to workers unobserved characteristics, named as residual 
inequality, and comprehend how residual inequality impacts wages. 
Katz and Murphy (1992) were the firsts to find the impact of these unobserved attributes 
on wage inequality. Helpman et al. (2010) and Amiti and Davis (2012) developed theories 
attempting to explain how unobservable attributes such as labour market efficiency and 
trade barriers impacted on workers’ wages. 
Assuming that firms involved in IT have more incentives to screen workers, finding better 
matches and therefore increasing productivity and wages, Helpman et al. (2010) found 
that workers employed in firms involved in IT will have more bargaining power and in 
the overall there is a growth in wages compared to domestic firms. This being, wage 
inequality increases.  
By developing a model of fair wages, Amiti and Davis (2012) establish that wages 
increase with higher profits, so more productive firms pay higher wages. Firms have the 
option to import and/or export or none. Firms that import and export are more productive 
and have better revenues than firms who only import, firms who only import are more 
productive than firms who only export and firms who only export are more productive 
than firms who do not trade. A reduction in trade barriers in imports or exports will 
increase the productivity of firms involved in IT and increase its wages comparing with 
domestic firms, thus increasing wage inequality.  
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Summing up, we can expect that, in general, globalization (FDI and/or IT) increases wage 
inequality by expanding the gap between groups of workers (see Table 2). In the 21 
theoretical approaches reviewed, 16 predict that FDI increases wage inequality, 8 predict 
a decrease, with 6 predicting a bi-causality relation. Only 4 state that no effect exists 
between these variables.  
 
Table 2: Analysis of the impact of FDI on wage inequality 
 Authors (year) 
IT/FDI 
 WI  
IT/FDI 
 WI 
No 
effect 
Traditional Theory Stolper and Samuelson (1941) X X   
Location Krugman (1991) X X   
Technology 
Katz and Murphy (1992) X     
Feenstra and Hanson (1996,1997) X     
Leamer (2000)     X 
Krugman (2000) X     
Autor et al. (2003); Autor et al. 
(2006) 
X     
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 
(2006, 2008) 
  X   
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 
(2012) 
  X   
Assortative matching Becker (1973); Helpman (2016) X X   
Firms’ heterogeneity 
Melitz (2003)     X 
Bernard, et al. (2007)     X  
Labor market 
frictions 
Diamond (1982a, b); Mortensen and 
Pissarides (1994)  
X X X 
Observable attributes 
Antràs et al. (2006) X X   
Costinot and Vogel (2010) X X   
Sampson (2014) X     
Grossman and Helpman (2016) X     
Observable attributes 
and technology choice 
Yeaple (2005) X     
Bustos (2011) X     
Residual inequality 
Helpman et al. (2010) X     
Amiti and Davis (2012) X     
  16 8 4 
Note: The X means that the referred study focused on that particular relation. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
2.3. Empirical evidence on the impact of FDI and wage inequality: a brief 
bibliometric analysis  
To obtain a comprehensive picture on the studies that analysed FDI and wage inequality, 
we undertook a quantitative approach to the literature, that is, a bibliometric exercise (see 
Pato and Teixeira, 2016). The main bibliographic databases for such purposes are the 
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Web of Science (WoS) and Scopus Sci Verse (Scopus). However, these databases present 
some advantages and disadvantages (see Teixeira, 2014) which advices the combination 
of both in other to obtain the referred comprehensive picture.5  
The search into the bibliographic databases was performed on 29th September 2016. As 
search keywords, we use the terms ‘wages’ and ‘foreign direct investment’. In Scopus, 
the search was done limited to the field ‘Keywords’, considering ‘All documents’ 
restricted to the field of ‘Social Sciences and Humanities’. This resulted in 131 
documents. In WoS, we use the same keywords in the search field ‘Topic’ and obtained 
391 documents. Combining the results of both databases, and eliminating the duplicate 
results, we reached to an amount of 455 documents to be analysed. 
We continued the analysis by reading the abstracts of each document, identifying the topic 
that was tackled, and assessing the effective relevance of each document for further 
analysis. We found that out of the 455, 89 (that is, 20%) dealt specifically with the issue 
of FDI and wage inequality. Other topics included the effects of FDI on employment (12 
papers), labour market (12 papers), gender (9), productivity (7), R&D (7), spillovers (7), 
and general effects/issues (35). Papers addressing the issue of FDI determinants represent 
14% of the total, whereas does addressing a miscellaneous of subjects included the bulk 
of the papers (41%). 
Regarding the papers that exclusively focus on FDI and wage inequality, we observe (see 
Figure 1) that the majority (58 papers, 65%) are empirical studies, whereas theoretical 
studies represent 27%, with only 7 papers being reviews of the literature on the topic. The 
bulk of the empirical studies (45 papers or 78%) analyse a single country, being China 
the country with more papers on this matter, due, mainly, to the country competitive 
advantage in (low-skilled) labour (Liu and Song, 1997). 
 
                                                 
5 WoS is older than Scopus and encompasses a longer time span in terms of articles published and 
corresponding citations. Scopus only emerged in 2004 and thus is not very representative of research 
published before 1995. Notwithstanding, Scopus encompasses a larger number of journals and other 
sources. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of the empirical studies on FDI and wage inequality 
Source: Own computation based on data gathered from Scopus and WoS 
 
As we can see in Table 3, and in accordance with the theoretical expectations (cf. Table 
2), the clear majority of the empirical studies on this subject indicates that FDI tends to 
increase wage inequality (e.g. Aitken et al., 1996; Robertson, 2000; Onaran, 2009; Chen 
et al., 2011; Lee and Wie, 2015). A reduced number of studies predict no effect of FDI 
on wages (e.g. Aitken et al., 1996; Blonigen and Slaughter, 2001). Other studies, such as 
Heyman et al. (2007) and Pittiglio, Reganati and Sica (2015), predict that FDI diminishes 
wage inequality. Some cross-country studies, like Aitken et al. (1996), detect two 
different effects, one that FDI increases wage inequality in the developing countries such 
as Mexico and Venezuela and that FDI has no effect on wage in the US. 
 
Table 3: Empirical studies on the impact of FDI on wage inequality: a synthesis 
Impact Country Period Authors (year) 
IT/FDI  
WI 
Mexico, Venezuela and US 
[in the case of Mexico and 
Venezuela] 
1987-1990 Aitken et al. (1996) 
Mexico 1987-1997 Robertson (2000) 
Mexico, Turkey and Korea 1987-2003 Onaran (2009) 
China 1998-2007 Chen et al. (2011) 
Indonesia 1990-2009 Lee and Wie (2015) 
FDI has no 
effect on WI 
Mexico, Venezuela and US 
[only in the case of the US] 
1987-1990 Aitken et al. (1996) 
US 1977-1994 Blonigen and Slaughter (2001) 
IT/FDI  
WI 
Sweden 1996-2000 Heyman et al. (2007) 
Italy 2015 Pittiglio et al. (2015) 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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2.4. Other determinants that influence countries’ wage inequality 
To fully comprehend the relation between FDI and wages, it is needed to control for other 
variables. In Table 4, we summarize some of the most frequent explanatory variables that 
the empirical literature uses for explaining wage inequality: countries’ degree of trade 
openness (Te Velde and Morrissey, 2004; Taylor and Driffield, 2005; Onaran, 2009; 
Figini and Gorg, 2011; Tomohara and Yokota, 2011), the level of economic development 
of a country (e.g. Gopinath and Chen, 2003; Dreher and Gaston, 2008), human capital 
(e.g. Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2004; Tansel and Bodur, 2012; Zulfiu-Alili, 2014), and 
corruption (no empirical study was found). 
Table 4: Other determinants of inequality: a brief account 
Impact Country Period 
Sign and 
significance of 
the estimated 
coefficient 
Authors (year) 
Degree of 
trade openness 
Hong Kong, Korea, 
Singapore, Thailand, 
Philippines 
1985-1998 ++ Te Velde and Morrissey (2004) 
UK 1983-2002 ++ Taylor and Driffield (2005) 
Thailand 1999-2003 +++ Tomohara and Yokota (2011) 
Level of 
economic 
development 
26 countries 1970-1995 ++ Gopinath and Chen (2003) 
156 countries 1970-2000 ++ Dreher and Gaston (2008) 
Human capital 
Indonesia 1996 +++ Lipsey and Sjoholm (2004) 
Turkey 1994-2002 +++ Tansel and Bodur (2012) 
Macedonia 2008 +++ Zulfiu-Alili (2014) 
Corruption No empirical studies found 
Legend: +++ (++) [+] / --- (--) [-] Positively/negatively and statistically significant at 1% (5%) [10%]. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Human capital is expected to have a positive impact on wage inequality and a high 
statistical significance in the explanation of the wage gap between workers, in the case of 
Indonesia (Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2004), Turkey (Tansel and Bodur, 2012) and Macedonia 
(Zulfiu-Alili, 2014). In a cross-country analysis, it is relevant to understand the education 
level of said country to comprehend wage inequality. Also, the level of economic 
development of a country might influence the wages paid in said country, so by analysing 
the GDP of every country Gopinath and Chen (2003) and Dreher and Gaston (2008) did 
a cross-country analysis and controlled for GDP magnitude and found that the impact is 
positive on wage inequality and it has 5% level of statistical significance. 
When looking to the degree of openness/trade authors such as Te Velde and Morrissey 
(2004), Taylor and Driffield (2005) and Tomohara and Yokota (2011) found that this 
variable has a positive impact on wage inequality and a statistical relevance of 5 to 10%.  
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3. Methodological considerations 
3.1. Econometric specification 
To have a clear idea of our methodological approach, we analysed the methodological 
approaches used by authors who did a cross-country/panel empirical analysis relating 
FDI/globalization and wage inequality using macro-level data (see Table 5). We had 
some difficulty encountering relevant empirical studies since most cross-country 
empirical studies analyse income rather than wage inequality. 
Focusing on this small set of studies, we observe that their methodological approaches 
involve a variety of estimation methods, from the simple Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
method (Lessmann, 2013), to more recent methods, such as the Dynamic Panels data 
(Gopinath and Chen, 2003; Dreher and Gaston, 2008). 
The pooled OLS estimation is the choice of Ezcurra and Rodriguez-Posse (2013). The 
authors analyse 47 countries over a period of 17 years. Through an analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) model, the authors detected that the variance between countries are due to 
endogeneity between variables and time only explains 1% of the variance in the 
dependent variable (wage inequality, being the Theil index the selected proxy). For this 
reason, they opted to calculate the mean for all variables throughout the total period and 
estimate a pooled OLS. 
In the presence of cross-section and time variant data, there is an endogeneity bias 
associated with the OLS estimation. Thus, Lessman (2013) uses two estimation methods 
separately, the pooled OLS and the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) 
to compare the validity of the OLS estimation method in the presence of endogeneity 
between the dependent variable (inequality) and independent variables (FDI). This 
happens because foreign investors might have two opposite behaviours in the presence of 
high inequality: they might not invest because of the risks associated with these countries; 
or they might want to invest because they want to be part of the future economic 
prosperity of this country. The LIML method is an instrumental variable method that 
permits to overcome the bias introduced by endogeneity. 
Due to the unobserved heterogeneity between countries, a fixed-effect panel is the method 
preferred by Figini and Gorg (2011) to allow to remove the country-specific effect. The 
fixed-effect panel is also used by Yay, Taştan and Oktayer (2016) with the addition of 
using the dynamic panel, as a robustness check for the fixed-effect panel. For these latter 
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authors, there is one main different reason favouring the use of the dynamic panel: the 
fact that inequality of today is arguably dependent on the past inequality. 
Similarly, Gopinath and Chen (2003) and Dreher and Gaston (2008) resorted to the most 
recent econometric estimation model, the dynamic panel data model. For Dreher and 
Gaston (2008: 524), the “OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent in the presence of fixed 
country effects” and it is added the lagged dependent variable because “inequality tends 
to change slowly over time”. Gopinath and Chen (2003) also recognized that changes in 
labour compensations shares are not instantaneous, taking time to adjust (2 years in their 
case). 
Based on the set of studies summarized in Table 5, and guided by the literature review 
performed in Section 2, we estimate our model using a panel of 39 (emerging) countries 
over a 45-year period, from 1970 to 2015. The chosen econometric specification is as 
follows: 
 
𝑊𝐼𝑖𝑡 =∝𝑖+ 𝑏1𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2 𝑡𝑜 5𝐗 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
where  
WI is a measure of wage inequality in the country i at year t, proxied separately by the 
Gini coefficient, the S90-S10 ratio, the S80-S20 Ratio, and the Industrial Pay Inequality 
index,  
FDI represents two separate measures of FDI: FDI inward flows as a percentage of the 
GDP as well as FDI stocks as a percentage of the GDP, and 
X is a vector of control variables which are usually considered to explain wage inequality, 
such as (see Section 2.4): GDP per capita to control for the countries’ level of economic 
development; openness (countries’ degree of trade openness) to control for international 
trade; average years of schooling, to control for the countries’ level of human capital and 
corruption, to control for irregularities in the countries’ institutions. 
u is a country specific effect, and 
𝜀𝑖𝑡the remaining white noise error term.  
Coefficient  𝑏1 gives the impact of FDI on wage inequality and coefficient  𝑏2 𝑡𝑜 5 gives 
us the impact of the control variables. All variables, their definition and data source, are 
explained in Table 7.
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Table 5: Methodological approaches to estimate the relationship between FDI and wage inequality 
Notes: (a) The KOF Index, is the acronym for the German word Konjunkturforschungsstelle, which means Business Cycle Research Institute, and it measures economic, political and social globalization by a 
panel of 23 variables. It has a scale from 1 to 100, being 1 de minimum level of globalization and the higher the values, the higher the degree of globalization. More information: http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch. 
Source: Own elaboration 
Author (year) 
Nº 
countries 
Period Methodology 
Dependent variables 
(proxy) 
Independent variables Control variables 
Ezcurra and 
Rodríguez-Pose 
(2013) 
47 1990-2007 
Pooled ordinary least squares 
(OLS) 
Theil index 
(log variation between 
GDP per capita and 
population share) 
KOF index(a) 
Number and size of the regions used in each country 
Level of economic development of the country 
Country size dummy distinguishing between federal 
and unitary states 
Proxy for the redistributive capacity of public sector 
Degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. 
Lessmann 
(2013) 
55 1980-2009 
Standard OLS 
and 
limited information 
maximum likelihood (LIML) 
estimator 
Coefficient of variation of 
GDP per capita (CV) 
Gini coefficient of 
regional GDP pc  
Weighted CV 
FDI inflows 
GDP per capita 
FDI (% GDP pc) 
Unemployment ratio 
Level of trade openness 
Share of urban living population 
Total population 
Share of employment in agriculture 
Figini and Gorg 
(2011) 
103 1980-2002 Fixed-effect panel 
Gini index 
Industrial Pay Inequality 
Index (UTIP-UNIDO) 
FDI inward stocks/GDP 
FDI inward stocks/GDP2 
Openness - (EXP+IMP)/GDP 
GDP per capita 
Number of students enrolled in secondary education 
Yay, Taştan and 
Oktayer (2016) 
90 1970-2005 
Fixed-effect panel 
and 
Dynamic panel 
Industrial Pay Inequality 
Index (UTIP-UNIDO) 
KOF Index 
and 
Economic Freedom of the World index 
(EFI) 
GDP per capita 
GDP per capita2 
Share of population with higher education 
Share of inactive population 
Democracy Index 
Level of industrialization 
Share of industry value added 
Gopinath and 
Chen (2003) 
26 1970-1995 Dynamic panel 
Share of labour 
compensation in GNP 
Vector of prices: 
Price indexes for agricultural, 
manufacturing and services sector 
 
Vector of factor endowment: 
Inward FDI stocks (developing 
economies) and Outward FDI stocks 
(developed economies) 
Land area 
Labour force 
Capital 
GNP share of labour 
GNP share of FDI 
- 
Dreher and 
Gaston (2008) 
156 1970-2000 Dynamic panel 
Industrial Pay Inequality 
Index (UTIP-UNIDO) 
Index of income 
inequality (EHII-UTIP) 
KOF index 
GDP per capita 
GDP per capita2 
Democracy index 
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3.2. Description of the variables 
3.2.1. Wage inequality variables 
In this section, we attempt to comprehend the main characteristics as well as the evolution 
of the four different wage inequality measures used in this study: the Gini coefficient, 
provided by SWIID database, the Industrial Pay Inequality Index, provided by UTIP 
database, the S90-S10 ratio and the S80-S20 ratio, both provided by the World Bank 
database (see Table 7 for more information about each measure). 
 
Table 6: Summary statistics of inequality measures, 1970-2015 
Variable Period Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Gini coefficient 1970-2015 1006 37.3 8.68 15.65 58.42 
Industrial Pay 
Inequality index 
1970-2008 747 0.057 0.051 0.001 0.432 
S90-S10 ratio 1980-2015 396 16.53 24.4 2.82 361.6 
S80-S20 ratio 1980-2015 396 8.30 5.52 2.23 65.83 
Source: Own elaboration based on data extracted from the sources in Table 7. 
 
When analysing Table 6, we observe that the Gini coefficient is the measure that has more 
data available for the period of our study, followed by the Industrial Pay Inequality index. 
The Gini coefficient values can vary from 0 to 100, being 0 perfect equality and 100 
perfect inequality. The mean for this coefficient is 37.3, hence in average all countries of 
our study show a medium-low degree of inequality. The minimum value observed is 15.7, 
that is, the lowest inequality observed, was in 1974, in Bulgaria, and the maximum value 
is 58.4 and it was observed in 2000, in Angola. The Industrial Pay Inequality index has 
values varying from 0 to 1, being 0 perfect equality and 1 perfect inequality. A mean of 
0.057 reflects that average inequality in the EEs in terms of manufacturing wages is 
relatively low. The EE with the lowest inequality moment is China, in 1977, with a value 
of 0.001, and the EE with the highest inequality was Peru, in 2003, with a value of 0.432. 
The mean of the S90-S10 ratio is 16.5, superior when compared to the mean of the S80-
S20 ratio, which is 8.3, meaning that the 10% higher income earners received on average 
16.5 times more income than the 10% lower income earners. Thus, there is a higher level 
of inequality between the 10% top/lower income earners compared to the 20% top/lower 
income earners.
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Table 7: Description of variables used in the estimation model 
 Name Description 
Nº of countries 
with available 
data 
Period with 
available 
data 
Database Source 
D
ep
en
d
en
t 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
Gini coefficient 
The Gini coefficient is a percentile representation of the Gini index. Both are a 
measure of the income distribution by each country’s population. It ranges from 0 to 
100, being 0 representative of perfect equality and 100 of perfect inequality. 
39 1950-2012 SWIID 
The Standardized 
World Income 
Inequality 
Database 
Industrial Pay 
Inequality (IPI) 
index 
Commonly known as the UTIP-UNIDO index, it was developed by the University of 
Texas Inequality Project and it is an index calculated through the Theil’s T-statistics 
method to measure industrial pay inequality, using data from the UNIDO Industrial 
Statistics database.  
34 1963-2008 UNIDO Industrial Statistics 
University of 
Texas – Inequality 
Project 
S90/S10 Ratio 
Income share held by the top 10% income earners divided by the income share held by 
the low 10% income earners. 
38 1980-2015 
Computed based on data provided by 
the World Bank national accounts 
data and OECD National Accounts 
data files. 
World Bank 
S80/S20 Ratio 
Income share held by the top 20% income earners divided by the income share held by 
the low 20% income earners. 
38 1980-2015 
Computed based on data provided by 
the World Bank national accounts 
data and OECD National Accounts 
data files. 
World Bank 
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
FDI inflows  
(as percentage of 
GDP) 
Foreign Direct Investment is defined, by UNCTAD, has a lasting investment made by 
a non-resident entity in an entity of another economy. To be considered FDI, the 
investor should own at least 10% of the voting power of the entity it is investing in. It 
relates to all transactions between the two entities and it relates to equity capital, 
reinvested earnings and intra-company loans (see section 2.1.2). 
39 1970-2015 World Investment Report 2016 UNCTAD 
FDI stocks  
(as percentage of 
GDP) 
39 1980-2015 World Investment Report 2016 UNCTAD 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
Openness 
(Percentage of 
Trade on GDP) 
Openness measures the level of trade openness of a country. It is calculated through 
the sum of exports and imports of goods and services divided by the gross domestic 
product. 
39 1960-2015 
World Bank national accounts data, 
and OECD National Accounts data 
files. 
World 
Development 
Indicators - World 
Bank 
GDP pc 
(constant 2010 
US Dollar) 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at constant 2010 prices in US dollars is the 
total GDP of a country in a year divided by its population. 
39 1960-2014 
World Bank national accounts data, 
and OECD National Accounts data 
files. 
World 
Development 
Indicators - World 
Bank 
Human Capital 
It is formally known as the Barro-Lee: Average years of total schooling, age 15+, 
total. Represents the average years of total completed education of the population over 
15 years old. Data is only available every five years; for the remaining years, we 
estimated based on the growth rate during that period. 
31 1970-2015 
Robert J. Barro and Jong-Wha Lee: 
http://www.barrolee.com/ 
Education 
Statistics - World 
Bank 
Corruption 
We used the indicator Control of Corruption: Percentile Rank. It captures the 
perception of the influence of private individuals on public power for private gain. It 
captures various levels of corruption. The percentile rank can vary from 0%, 
corresponding to lowest rank, meaning total influence of private individuals of 
government power for private gain, and 100%, corresponding to the highest rank, 
meaning no influence of private individuals on public power for private gain. Hereafter 
named as the “Corruption” variable. 
39 1996-2015 
Detailed documentation of the WGI, 
interactive tools for exploring the 
data, and full access to the underlying 
source data available at 
www.govindicators.org. 
World Bank 
Note: 1 Developed by Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2010).  "The Worldwide Governance Indicators:  Methodology and Analytical Issues".  World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1682)  
Source: Own elaboration
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The S90-S10 ratio is also a more disperse ratio of inequality when compared to the S80-
S20 ratio, meaning that the values of this ratio vary more significantly from countries and 
years. The minimum value both for the S90-S10 and the S80-S20 ratios, occurred in 2004 
for Azerbaijan, with, correspondingly, 2.82 and 2.23. The maximum value for the S90-
S10 ratio was 361.6, and it was registered in Colombia, in 2000, and the maximum for 
the S80-S20 ratio was 65.8, and it was registered in Zambia, in 1991. 
Peru and Angola are frequent attenders of the top five for all the inequality measures (see 
Table 8). Armenia, Cambodia and Azerbaijan stand as high inequality countries for 
Industrial Pay Inequality Index, whereas Colombia, Chile and Zambia rank high in the 
remaining measures. 
 
Table 8: The five countries with the highest inequality, according to the four inequality measures 
Gini coefficient Industrial Pay Inequality index S90S10 ratio S80S20 ratio 
1st Angola 51.98 1st Peru 0.187 1st Colombia 67.77 1st Zambia 20.8 
2nd Peru 51.39 2nd Angola 0.162 2nd Zambia 53.72 2nd Colombia 20.26 
3rd Colombia 50.47 3rd Armenia 0.162 3rd Chile 32.39 3rd Chile 15.7 
4th Zambia 49.97 4th Cambodia 0.149 4th Peru 31.36 4th Peru 15.13 
5th Chile 49.79 5th Azerbaijan 0.123 5th Angola 28.34 5th Angola 13.29 
Source: Own elaboration based on data extracted from the sources in Table 7. 
 
Grouping EEs by world region (see Table 9) we observe higher levels of inequality 
between 1970 and 2015 in Latin America and Caribbean (see Figure 2).  
 
Table 9: Countries divided by world regions  
World Region 
Nº 
Countries 
Country 
Europe & Central Asia 15 
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, 
Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland, 
Romania, Serbia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan 
Sub-Saharan Africa 8 
Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia 
East Asia & Pacific 7 
Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Thailand, Vietnam 
Latin America & Caribbean 5 Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Peru, Uruguay 
South Asia 3 Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka 
Middle East & North Africa 1 Morocco 
Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank. - http://www.worldbank.org/en/country Accessed on 29th of March 2017. 
 
In contrast, the world region with lower level of inequality is Europe and Central Asia. 
Between 1970 and 1989 there was a high decrease in the inequality for the African 
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continent (Sub Saharan Africa and Middle East and North Africa), as well as in European 
and Central Asian EEs. Afterwards, there were no major increases or decreases. 
 
 
Figure 2: Gini coefficient by world regions, 1970-2015 
Source: Own computation based on data gathered from SWIID 
 
Dividing the Gini by countries’ income group (see Table 10), the high-income countries 
show low levels of inequality and the lower-middle-income EEs show the highest level 
of inequality, except between 1980 and 1989 (see Figure 3). 
 
Table 10: Countries divided by World Bank’s income level distribution  
Income Level Nº Countries Country 
Low 4 Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda 
Lower-middle 14 
Armenia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, 
Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan, 
Vietnam, Zambia 
Upper-middle 16 
Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, China, 
Colombia, Dominican Republic, Kazakhstan, Montenegro, Peru, 
Romania, Serbia, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan 
High 5 Chile, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Uruguay 
Note: Classification based on Gross National Income per capita (GNI pc), estimated using World Bank Atlas method and data from 
2015. Low income – $1,025 or less. Lower middle income - between $1,026 and $4,035; Upper middle income - between 
$4,036 and $12,475; High income - $12,476 or more. 
Source: Own elaboration based on information provided by World Bank - 
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519 Accessed on 29th of March 2017.  
 
Between 1980 and 1989 the low income became the group of countries with higher 
inequality levels and the high-income countries continue to be the group of countries with 
lower inequality levels. Recently, between 2010 and 2015, the low-income countries 
became the group of countries with lower inequality and the lower-middle-income 
countries the group of countries with higher inequality. 
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Figure 3: Gini coefficient by countries’ income level, 1970-2015 
Source: Own computation based on data gathered from SWIID 
 
The Industrial Pay Inequality index (see Figure 4) was, in the 1970s, low for all countries 
(with an average value bellow 0.08) and very small variances until 1999. The countries 
in Europe and Central Asia were the countries with lowest inequality until in this period. 
  
 
Figure 4: Industrial Pay Inequality index by world regions, 1970-2008 
Source: Own computation based on data gathered from UTIP 
Between 2000 and 2009, inequality increased (almost doubled) for Latin America and 
Caribbean (Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Peru and Uruguay), thus being the 
group of EEs with higher inequality in that period. The inequality in Middle East and 
North Africa (Morocco), South Asia (Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka), and Europe and 
27 
Central Asia also increased, whereas in Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia and Pacific 
there was a decrease in inequality, being the group of countries with the lowest inequality 
in that period, together with Europe and Central Asia. 
When analysing the Industrial Pay Inequality index by EEs income level (see Figure 5) 
we observe that the high-income EEs show lower inequality throughout the whole period 
(1970-2008). In the seventies (1970s), the low-income EEs showed higher levels of 
inequality. Afterwards, this tendency changed. From 1990s onwards the lower-middle 
and upper-middle-income EEs became the group of countries with higher inequality. 
 
 
Figure 5: Industrial Pay Inequality Index by countries’ income level, 1970-2008 
Source: Own computation based on data gathered from UTIP 
 
The percentage of income detained by the top 10% income earners when compared to the 
lower 10% income earners is much higher in Latin America and Caribbean (Chile, 
Colombia, Dominican Republic, Peru and Uruguay) (see Figure 6) than in South Asia 
(Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka) and Middle East and North Africa (Morocco). In Latin 
America and Caribbean (Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Peru and Uruguay), 
inequality increased significantly between 1990 and 2009, although in more recent years 
(2010-2015), it was reduced to slightly lower levels than those from the 1980s.  
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Figure 6: S90-S10 Ratio by world regions, 1980-2015 
Source: Own computation based on data gathered from World Bank 
 
When analysing the countries by groups of income level (see Figure 7), the low-income 
EEs are almost always the group evidencing the lowest levels of inequality, whereas in 
the other extreme stands the upper-middle-income EEs. 
 
 
Figure 7: S90-S10 Ratio by countries’ income level, 1980-2015 
Source: Own computation based on data gathered from World Bank 
 
The S80-S20 ratio (see Figure 8) shows almost the same pattern as the S90-S10 ratio, 
albeit with much lower averages per region/year. Latin America and Caribbean (Chile, 
Colombia, Dominican Republic, Peru and Uruguay) is the region of the world with higher 
inequality and South Asia (Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka) and Europe and Central Asia 
are the regions with lower inequality. 
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Figure 8: S80-S20 Ratio by world regions, 1980-2015 
Source: Own computation based on data gathered from World Bank 
 
In Figure 9, lower-middle-income EEs display higher levels of inequality between the top 
20% income group and the 20% lower income group. Low income EEs have displayed 
usually (except between 1990 and 1999) the lowest levels of inequality. 
 
Figure 9: S80-S20 Ratio by countries’ income level, 1980-2015 
Source: Own computation based on data gathered from World Bank 
 
3.2.2. Foreign direct investment variables 
To understand how FDI evolves within the EEs, we gathered and compared data on both 
inward flows and stocks. Table 11 presents the number of observations available, standard 
deviation, minimum, and maximum values for both measures of FDI. The number of 
observations vary from the fact that FDI inward flows data is available since 1970 and 
FDI stocks data is available since 1980, both from UNCTAD statistics database. 
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Table 11: Summary statistics of the foreign direct investment variables, 1970-2015 
Variable Period Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
FDI inward flows 1970-2015 1431 2.69 4.21 -14.37 45.15 
FDI stocks 1980-2015 1168 22.97 23.25 3.79E-7 195.49 
Source: Own elaboration based on data extracted from the sources in Table 7. 
 
When looking closely to the available data, the overall standard deviation for FDI inward 
flows is of 4.21 and for FDI stocks of 23.25, although FDI inward flows tend to vary more 
between years (standard deviation - 3.63) than between countries (standard deviation - 
3.14). FDI stocks on the other way, tend to vary more between countries (standard 
deviation – 20.20) than throughout the years (16.92). According to Wacker (2016), this 
is one of the main differences between both variables: FDI flows tend to vary significantly 
between years, in reaction to policies and economy fluctuations, FDI stocks are less prone 
to these changes. When analysing both Figures 12-15, it is possible to observe the variable 
FDI stock is not as irregular as FDI inward flows, going in line with the previous 
statement. FDI inward flows reach the maximum of 45.2% of the GDP, in 2003, for 
Azerbaijan, and a minimum of -14.4% of the GDP, for that same country, in 2007. As for 
the FDI stocks the minimum value 3.79E-7% of the GDP occurred in Turkmenistan, in 
1992, and the maximum 195.5%, in Mozambique, in 2015. 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Average FDI inward flows, all EEs, 1970-2015 
Source: Own computation based on data gathered from UNCTAD 
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Figure 11: Average FDI stocks, all EEs, 1980-2015 
Source: Own computation based on data gathered from UNCTAD 
 
Within the sample of EEs, the five countries that received more FDI inflows over the 
period in analysis (1970-2015) were Montenegro,6 Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Bulgaria and 
Turkmenistan (see Figure 10). Montenegro, Zambia, Serbia, Chile and Cambodia present 
the highest levels of FDI stocks (see Figure 11). 
Figures 12 shows the behaviour, over time, of FDI inward flows, separated by world 
regions (cf. Table 9). Accordingly, FDI inflows for all countries were relatively low 
between 1970 and 1979, being the main receiver countries based in Latin America and 
Caribbean (Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Peru and Uruguay), and East Asian 
EEs, whereas Europe and Central Asia stood at the bottom.  
 
Figure 12: FDI inward flows by world regions, 1970-2015 
Source: Own computation based on data gathered from UNCTAD 
                                                 
6 For Montenegro and Serbia data is only available from 2008 onwards, due to the separation of Serbia and 
Montenegro in 2006. Due to the small set of data restricted to the most recent years, the average of FDI 
stocks and inflows for both countries are higher than for the remaining countries. 
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FDI inflows (as percentage of the GDP) grew markedly for all regions, with an annual 
average growth rate, for the 45 years in study, of 11.8%. The annual average rate of 
growth for the Latin America and Caribbean (Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, 
Peru and Uruguay) and Middle East and North Africa (Morocco) regions was the lowest 
(5.3% and 4.5%, respectively) and the highest occurred in European and Central Asian 
EEs (annual average growth rate of 15.9%).  
Between 1990 and 1999, the main receivers within EEs were the countries from East Asia 
and Pacific and Europe and Central Asia, whereas between 2000 and 2009 FDI inflows 
targeted mainly the EEs located in Europe and Central Asia. In 2000-2009 there was a 
decrease of the average FDI inflows for the Middle East and North Africa (Morocco). 
More recently (2010-2015), there was a considerable decrease of FDI inflows for Europe 
and Central Asia.  
When analysing the evolution of FDI inflows by groups of income (cf. Table 9) we 
observe a general positive trend over the whole period (see Figure 13). From 1970 until 
1999 the low-income countries presented a lower inflow of FDI as compared with the 
other economies, but in the most recent years (2010 and 2015), the level of FDI inward 
flows for low-income countries grew significantly with an annual average growth rate of 
11,9% in this period. The upper-middle EE’s where, between 1970 and 2015, the group 
of EE’s with highest levels of inflows of FDI as well as the highest growth rate of inward 
flows of FDI (14.9%), but they were surpassed by the low-income economies in the most 
recent years (2010 and 2015).  
 
 
Figure 13: FDI inward flows by countries’ income level, 1970-2015 
Source: Own computation based on data gathered from UNCTAD 
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FDI stocks (see Figure 14 and Figure 15) have a general tendency to increase as they are 
the accumulation of revaluated inward flows. Nonetheless, FDI stocks grew for all 
available years and countries at an annual average growth rate of 9.7%. 
 
 
Figure 14: FDI stocks by world regions, 1980-2015 
Source: Own computation based on data gathered from UNCTAD 
 
South Asian EEs (Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka) FDI stocks (see Figure 14) 
experienced a low average growth rate (when compared with the remaining EEs) of 5.7%, 
being the world region with lower levels of FDI stocks for the total period in study. All 
the remaining EEs experienced a high increase of FDI stocks between 1980 and 2015, 
expect for Latin America and Caribbean (Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Peru 
and Uruguay) and Middle East and North Africa (Morocco), in which the average stocks 
started growing only after the period of 1990 to 1999. 
In terms of income level groups (see Figure 15), FDI stocks in the 1980 decade were 
higher for high-income EEs and lower for low-income EEs. Between 1990 and 1999 the 
stock of FDI decreased for the high-income EEs, with lower levels than the lower-middle-
income EEs. In the recent years (2010-2015) the countries with higher levels of FDI stock 
are the low-income economies and the EEs with lower levels of FDI stocks are the lower-
middle-income EEs. 
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Figure 15: FDI stocks by countries’ income level, 1980-2015 
Source: Own computation based on data gathered from UNCTAD 
 
3.2.3. Control variables 
In Table 12 we take a closer look at the control variables of our model: openness, GDP 
per capita, human capital and corruption, with data for all variables provided by the World 
Bank. 
 
 
Table 12: Summary statistics of the control variables, 1970-2015 
Variable Period Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Openness 1970-2015 1324 62.34 33.43 0.17 178.99 
GDP per capita 1970-2015 1415 3151.7 3072.6 130.4 15346.8 
Human Capital 1985-2010 806 6.82 2.54 0.93 11.6 
Corruption 1996-2015 659 36.87 21.5 0.47 92.2 
Source: Own elaboration based on data extracted from the sources in Table 7. 
 
The openness variable evaluates a country’s openness to trade, by dividing the total trade 
of a country (imports and exports) by its GDP. The higher the value, the more open to 
trade is the economy. The average value of this variable for the past 45 years was of 
62.3% (as shown in Table 12), meaning that taking the countries as whole, the degree of 
openness is reasonably high. The minimum value of a country trade openness was of 
0.17% in 2009, in Myanmar, and the maximum value is 178.99% in Angola, in 1999. The 
top five countries in terms of average openness, between 1970 and 2015, are 
Turkmenistan (126%), Belarus (125%), Lithuania (116%), Angola (115%) and Vietnam 
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(107%). The EEs with the lowest levels of openness are Colombia (33%), China (31%), 
Bangladesh (27%), India (25%) and Myanmar (10%).  
The GDP per capita is the variable with more data available of all the control variables. 
Its mean is of 3151.7 constant US dollars (2010) per capita. The minimum value of 130.4 
is observed in Azerbaijan in 1995 and the maximum value in Lithuania, in 2015, of 
15346.8 constant US dollars per capita. The five countries with the highest average GDP 
per capita between 1970 and 2015 are: Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Uruguay and Chile. The 
countries with the lowest average GDP per capita are Bangladesh, Uganda, Myanmar, 
Mozambique and Ethiopia. 
The human capital variable describes the average years of schooling. So, the adult 
population of the EEs possesses, on average, 6.8 years of formal education, varying 
significantly between countries and years. The minimum value for this variable is 0.93 
years for Mozambique, in 1995. The maximum value for this variable is 11,6 years of 
schooling for Kazakhstan, in 2005. The countries that evidence higher levels of schooling 
are basically the transition countries, namely Armenia (10.4), Poland (10.0), Romania 
(9.8), Kazakhstan (9.8) and Lithuania (9.5). The countries with lowest years of schooling 
are Bangladesh (4.2), Morocco (3.6), Myanmar (3.6), Cambodia (3.6) and Mozambique 
(1.2). 
The corruption index indicates the level of influence of private individuals on public 
power of each country. As a percentage, 0% means total influence of private individuals 
on the government power and 100% means no corruption perceived. The highest level of 
corruption occurred in Myanmar, in 2011, with 0.47%. The value of 92.2% was the lowest 
level of corruption observed in Chile, in 2000. The five countries with the lowest level of 
corruption are Chile (90.1%), Uruguay (83.3%), Poland (68.3%), Lithuania (63.2%) and 
Latvia (59.5%). The countries with the highest levels of corruption are Uzbekistan 
(11.7%), Nigeria (10.4%), Turkmenistan (7.6%), Angola (5.1%) and Myanmar (5.0%).
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4. Empirical results 
In the previous section, Section 3, by analysing the behaviour of the different variables, 
it is possible to conclude that not only “the emerging economies represent a highly 
heterogeneous group, in terms of economic size, population, levels of per capita income 
and growth performance over the past decade” (OECD, 2011), but also a very 
heterogeneous group in terms of FDI inward flows and levels of FDI stocks, as well as 
inequality levels. They are characterized as the economies “arising from the necessity of 
differentiating developing countries that entered the take-off phase from those still 
entrapped in their early stages of development” (Saccone, 2017: 800). This author 
attempts to close on a concept of EEs that in the last 15 years showed a GDP pc as well 
as its growth rate above world average (including other variables to measure this growth). 
We can also see the heterogeneity by observing Table 10 in which, according to their 
Gross National Income per capita, EEs can fit into the four different income levels 
distinguished by the World Bank. Taking this heterogeneity into consideration, we 
decided on using the fixed-effect panel, on opposition to other estimation methods. This 
model, estimated through the software Stata, version 14, allows us to control for country 
specific effects, thus giving us a more reliable outcome.  
We performed some diagnosis tests, namely that of homoscedasticity by running OLS 
estimations and obtaining the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test, the White's test, and 
the Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test. For the three tests, we rejected the 
null hypothesis (of homoscedasticity), which meant that we have heteroscedastic 
residuals. These advices to estimate robust fixed-effect panel coefficients. We also test 
for the presence of multicollinearity by using the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF). For 
all estimations, the level of the VIFs were bellow 5, indicating that the phenomenon of 
multicollinearity is not present in our estimations (O’Brien, 2007).7 In all regressions, the 
Hausman test indicates that the fixed-effect panel is preferable to random-effect in 
estimating our models. 
In Tables 13-16 we present the results of the estimations of the robust fixed-effect panels 
separated by each of the four-wage inequality measures we gathered (Gini coefficient, 
S90-S10 Ratio, S80-S20 Ratio, and the Industrial Pay Inequality index), and for each of 
the FDI measures we use (FDI inflows and FDI stocks). Estimated models present distinct 
adjustment qualities: some (e.g., A1, B1, C1) have poor fit, with low R2 and most of the 
                                                 
7 In Appendix we present, for illustrative purposes, the correlation matrix, the VIF and the 
heteroscedasticity tests for the baseline model. 
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individual coefficients being statistically non-significant, whereas other models present 
reasonable fit, with several individual coefficients being statistically significant and/or R2 
above 20% (e.g., A2, A2’, B3’, D1, D2, D1’). All estimations include logarithmized 
variables, meaning that estimated coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. For each 
inequality measure, first we estimated our base model (Models 1), controlling only for 
Openness and GDP pc, due to the fact that these are the control variables with more data 
available. Then, we added Human Capital has control variable (Models 2), and, finally, 
we added the variable Corruption (Models 3) obtaining a more complete set of 
specifications but with less observations, because the corruption variable is only available 
for the period between 1996 and 2015.There are similarities in the results for all EEs (see 
Table 13) when using the Gini coefficient and the Industrial Pay Inequality index as the 
dependent variables, with the results being in general significant and positive for all 
estimations either for FDI inward flows (A2, D1 and D2) or for FDI stocks (A1’, A2’, 
D1’ and D2’), with the exception of the models that include corruption as control variable 
(A3, A3’, C3’, D3 and D3') and in the base model of the Gini coefficient and FDI inward 
flows (A1).  
With our general estimates for this two inequality measures, we can conclude that FDI 
(inward flows or stocks) increases wage inequality in the EEs, going in line with the 
general studies of globalization and inequality (Dreher and Gaston, 2008; Ezcurra and 
Rodríguez-Pose, 2013; Faustino and Vali, 2013; Yay et al., 2016). Moreover, there is 
evidence that FDI has a greater impact in increasing inequality in terms of wages than in 
terms of income, being the elasticities about 10% greater when we use the Industrial Pay 
Inequality index (0.13 to 0.21 percentage points) than when we use the Gini coefficient 
(0.01 and 0.02 percentage points). As Dreher and Gaston (2008), globalization (measured 
through the KOF index) also has a greater impact on inequality measured by the Industrial 
Pay Inequality index than household income (EHII - UTIP). Regarding the ratios S90-
S10 and S80-S20, the first two specifications (Models 1 and 2), that corresponds to the 
periods 1970-2015 and 1985-2015, the estimates associated with FDI (inflows and stocks) 
are not statistically significant, for the Models 3, that is, the most recent period, 1996-
2015, estimates for either measures of FDI are statistically significant and negative. (B3, 
B3’ and C3), meaning that, on average, in the last twenty years, EEs that received higher 
inflows (or possess higher stocks) of FDI tend to, all the remaining factor remaining 
constant, lessen the gap between highest and lowest income earners. In other words, FDI 
contributed in the last two decades to a decrease in inequality (as proxied by the ratios of 
top versus low income earners) of EEs.
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Table 13: Determinants of wage inequality, all EEs (panel fixed effects, robust estimations, marginal effects) 
 Gini Coefficient S90-S10 Ratio 
 Model  
A1 
1970-2015 
A2 
1985-2015 
A3 
1996-2015 
A1’ 
1970-2015 
A2’ 
1985-2015 
A3’ 
1996-2015 
B1 
1970-2015 
B2 
1985-2015 
B3 
1996-2015 
B1’ 
1970-2015 
B2’ 
1985-2015 
B3’ 
1996-2015 
F
D
I 
FDI inward flows (% 
GDP) 
0.0063 0.0115* -0.0048    0.0167 0.0214 -0.0681***      
(0.0610) (0.0068) (0.0054)    (0.0221) (0.0138) (0.0255)      
FDI stocks (% GDP)  
   0.0213*** 0.0207** -0.0030       0.0650 0.0544 -0.1622* 
   (0.0316) (0.0091) (0.0140)       (0.0450) (0.0442) (0.1000) 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
a
r
ia
b
le
s Openness 
0.0503* 0.0614** 0.0789** 0.0437 0.0472 0.0680* 0.1736 0.1972 0.3310* 0.1365 0.1755 0.3440* 
(0.0271) (0.0289) (0.0345) (0.0321) (0.0350) (0.0363) (0.1184) (0.1317) (0.1734) (0.1301) (0.1440) (0.2008) 
GDP per capita 
0.0586 0.1270** 0.0632 0.0422 0.1095* 0.0587 -0.1331 -0.0470 0.0064 -0.2092* -0.1034 0.1233 
(0.0475) (0.0577) (0.0594) (0.0537) (0.0649) (0.0618) (0.1130) (0.2229) (0.2514) (0.1267) (0.2144) (0.2931) 
Human capital 
 -0.1229 -0.0377  -0.1072 -0.0060   0.2325 -0.1652   0.2517 0.0264 
 (0.1052) (0.0947)  (0.1109) (0.1002)   (0.4246) (0.6002)   (0.3919) (0.5322) 
Control of Corruption 
  -0.0006   0.0033     -0.0204     -0.0108 
  (0.0159)   (0.0172)     (0.1271)     (0.1331) 
                      
Number of observations 863 619 339 821 619 340 364 259 187 362 259 187 
Number of countries 38 30 30 38 30 30 37 28 28 37 28 28 
R2 0.1456 0.3536 0.176 0.2031 0.3603 0.1632 0.0238 0.0586 0.0480 0.0402 0.0713 0.0670 
   
  S80-S20 Ratio Industrial Pay Inequality Index (UTIP-UNIDO) 
 Model  
C1 
1970-2015 
C2 
1985-2015 
C3 
1996-2015 
C1’ 
1970-2015 
C2’ 
1985-2015 
C3’ 
1996-2015 
D1 
1970-2015 
D2 
1985-2015 
D3 
1996-2015 
D1’ 
1970-2015 
D2’ 
1985-2015 
D3’ 
1996-2015 
F
D
I 
FDI inward flows (% 
GDP) 
0.0128 0.0154 -0.0466***    0.1295*** 0.1280*** -0.0185    
(0.0176) (0.0112) (0.0172)    (0.0254) (0.0392) (0.0698)    
FDI stocks (% GDP) 
   0.0463 0.0374 -0.0787       0.2115*** 0.1976*** 0.1645 
   (0.0325) (0.0316) (0.0536)       (0.1433) (0.0412) (0.1073) 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
a
r
ia
b
le
s Openness 
0.1262 0.1549* 0.2151* 0.1019 0.1431 0.2101* 0.1879* 0.1618 0.5500** 0.1647 0.0001 0.4578 
(0.0893) (0.0925) (0.1126) (0.0986) (0.1022) (0.1277) (0.1129) (0.2291) (0.2574) (0.1433) (0.2160) (0.2891) 
GDP per capita 
-0.1155 -0.0716 -0.0872 -0.1726* -0.1125 -0.0480 0.1535 0.2352 0.0019 0.1723 0.0824 -0.4106 
(0.0848) (0.1667) (0.1730) (0.0968) (0.1601) (0.1815) (0.2405) (0.3321) (0.0018) (0.2380) (0.3600) (0.3579) 
Human capital 
 0.2123 0.1734  0.2154 0.2825   0.0286 1.0039   0.3916 0.3318 
 (0.3259) (0.3368)  (0.2998) (0.3335)   (0.7238) (1.1369)   (0.7216) (0.9478) 
Control of Corruption 
  0.0315   0.0491     0.1138     0.0118 
  (0.0728)   (0.0747)     (0.1975)     (0.1979) 
                      
Number of observations 364 259 187 362 259 187 582 386 168 492 396 170 
Number of countries 37 28 28 37 28 28 32 29 26 32 29 26 
R2 0.0346 0.0861 0.0884 0.0531 0.0972 0.4135 0.2552 0.2204 0.1048 0.2625 0.2373 0.1383 
Legend: *** (**) [*] Statistically significant at 1% (5%) [10%].  
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Grey cells identify the statistically significant coefficients. All variables were logarithmized. 
Source: Own elaboration
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Estimation results by decades using the baseline model (see Table 14), evidence that, 
in general, the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s were periods of time where FDI impacted 
positively inequality indicators. That is, FDI contributed to an increase in EEs’ income 
and wage inequality. Specifically, and for the 1980s and 1990s decades, a 1 percentage 
point increase in the inflows (stocks) of FDI, lead, on average, to a 0.01 (0.02-0.07) 
percentage points in the Gini coefficient (see Models E2, E3, E2’, E3’), 0.03 (0.11-
0.14) percentage points in S90-S10 ratio (see Models F2, F2’, F3’), 0.03 (0.08-0.16) 
percentage points in S80-S20 ratio (see Models G2, G2’, G3’), and 0.12 (0.21) 
percentage points in Industrial Pay Inequality (see Models H3, H3’). 
For the initial decade (1970s), we only have enough data to estimate the models for 
the Gini coefficient and Industrial Pay Inequality index using FDI inflows (Models E1 
and H1). The evidence indicates that FDI contributes significantly for increasing wage 
inequality (IPI index) of EEs in the 1970s, but nothing can be concluded regarding 
income inequality (as reflected by the Gini coefficient). The last fifteen years (2000-
2015) reveal a different picture. In concrete, when using the Gini coefficient as the 
proxy for income/wage inequality, there is not enough evidence to claim that FDI 
(inflows and stocks) impacts on EEs’ inequality.  
In contrast, when we use the S90-S10 or S80-S20 ratios, we find that FDI inflows 
contribute to a decrease in income inequality in the period before the world financial 
crisis (2000-2007) (see Models F4 and G4), but no evidence exists that FDI 
(inflows/stocks) impact on income inequality in the period after (2008-2015) (Models 
F5, F5’, G5, G5’).  
FDI (inflows and stocks) impact significantly and positively in Industrial Pay 
Inequality index in the period 2000-2007 (no data is available for estimating the 
following period). Thus, in contrast to what we observe for top-low earners income 
indicator, FDI continues to contribute to a wage inequality increase in EEs in the 
2000s. 
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Table 14: Determinants of wage inequality, all EEs (panel fixed effects, robust estimations), by decades, 1970-2015 
  Gini Coefficient 
 Model  
E1 
1970s 
E2 
1980s 
E3 
1990s 
E4 
2000-2008 
E5 
2009-2015 
E1’ 
1970s 
E2’ 
1980s 
E3’ 
1990s 
E4’ 
2000-2008 
E5’ 
2009-2015 
F
D
I 
FDI inward 
flows 
0.0195 0.0129* 0.0147** -0.0139 -0.0012      
(0.0133) (0.0070) (0.0062) (0.01607) (0.0076)      
FDI stocks  
      0.0781*** 0.0201*** 0.0057 0.0311 
      (0.0205) (0.0044) (0.0413) (0.0197) 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
a
r
ia
b
le
s 
Openness 
0.0505 0.0659* 0.0021 0.0620 0.0664*  0.0061 -0.0035 0.0464 0.0592* 
(0.0908) (0.0384) (0.0356) (0.04011) (0.0361)  (0.0565) (0.0374) (0.0319) (0.0350) 
GDP per capita 
0.1011 -0.0419 0.0385 0.0493 -0.1489**  -0.0708 0.0485 0.0402 -0.1669*** 
(0.1662) (0.1300) (0.0435) (0.0390) (0.0639)  (0.0727) (0.0425) (0.0363) (0.0563) 
              
Nº of observations 25 96 291 302 129 No obs. 98 286 308 129 
Nº of countries 10 16 35 37 32  18 35 36 32 
R2 0.3234 0.1078 0.1484 0.0770 0.2062  0.2971 0.2464 0.0473 0.2208 
 S90-S10 Ratio 
 Model  
F1 
1970s 
F2 
1980s 
F3 
1990s 
F4 
2000-2008 
F5 
2009-2015 
F1’ 
1970s 
F2’ 
1980s 
F3’ 
1990s 
F4’ 
2000-2008 
F5’ 
2009-2015 
F
D
I 
FDI inward 
flows (% GDP) 
 0.0372* 0.0382 -0.0758* 0.0246      
 (0.0207) (0.0492) (0.0410) (0.0338)      
FDI stocks (% 
GDP)  
      0.1364*** 0.1059*** -0.2037 -0.0060 
      (0.0532) (0.0343) (0.1548) (0.0512) 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
a
r
ia
b
le
s 
Openness 
 -0.3673*** 0.1831 0.1296 0.1697  -0.1073 0.2538 0.2117 0.0641 
 (0.0709) (0.2396) (0.1903) (0.1578)  (0.0961) (0.2103) (0.1931) (0.1918) 
GDP per capita 
 -0.2728*** 0.0349 -0.0636 -0.6738***  -0.1750** -0.1663 -0.0422 -0.6969*** 
 (0.0712) (0.2439) (0.1563) (0.1748)  (0.0764) (0.1846) (0.1766) (0.1954) 
              
Nº of observations No obs. 20 83 157 104 No obs. 23 79 156 104 
Nº of countries  13 31 34 30  15 29 33 30 
R2  0.8239 0.0358 0.0414 0.1413  0.7738 0.1240 0.0523 0.1360 
  S80-S20 Ratio 
 Model  
G1 
1970s 
G2 
1980s 
G3 
1990s 
G4 
2000-2008 
G5 
2009-2015 
G1’ 
1970s 
G2’ 
1980s 
G3’ 
1990s 
G4’ 
2000-2008 
G5’ 
2009-2015 
F
D
I 
FDI inward 
flows (% GDP) 
 0.0267* 0.0290 -0.0613** 0.0101      
 (0.0164) (0.0369) (0.0314) (0.0248)      
FDI stocks (% 
GDP)  
      0.1637*** 0.0767*** -0.1124 -0.0069 
      (0.0339) (0.0261) (0.0997) (0.0395) 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
a
r
ia
b
le
s 
Openness 
 -0.2836* 0.1541 0.1025 0.0989  -0.0153 0.2021 0.1064 0.0335 
 (0.1573) (0.1818) (0.1236) (0.1135)  (0.0556) (0.1598) (0.1236) (0.1171) 
GDP per capita 
 -0.1640 -0.0363 -0.0536 -0.5235***  -0.0801* -0.1709 -0.0381 -0.5340*** 
 (0.1239) (0.1776) (0.1085) (0.1446)  (0.0441) (0.1504) (0.1263) (0.1560) 
              
Nº of observations No obs. 20 83 157 104 No obs. 23 79 156 104 
Nº of countries  13 31 34 30  15 29 33 30 
R2  0.6331 0.0421 0.0795 0.1635  0.8656 0.1485 0.0488 0.1707 
  Industrial Pay Inequality Index (UTIP-UNIDO) 
 Model  
H1 
1970s 
H2 
1980s 
H3 
1990s 
H4 
2000-2008 
H5 
2009-2015 
H1’ 
1970s 
H2’ 
1980s 
H3’ 
1990s 
H4’ 
2000-2008 
H5’ 
2009-2015 
F
D
I 
FDI inward 
flows (% GDP) 
0.0769*** 0.0283 0.1206*** 0.0373*       
(0.0257) (0.0516) (0.0391) (0.0215)       
FDI stocks (% 
GDP)  
      0.2101 0.2090*** 0.1616**  
      (0.1314) (0.0435) (0.0783)  
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
a
r
ia
b
le
s 
Openness 
0.0185 0.0786 -0.1199 0.3982*   0.0516 -0.1692 0.2557  
(0.2311) (0.1493) (0.3727) (0.2336)   (0.1434) (0.3529) (0.1937)  
GDP per capita 
0.7377* -0.0996 0.2837 -0.5375**   -0.1327 0.2540 -0.5954***  
(0.4413) (0.5301) (0.4249) (0.2735)   (0.3471) (0.3803) (0.2164)  
              
Nº of observations 105 133 193 151 No obs. No obs. 144 194 154 No obs. 
Nº of countries 14 16 29 25   18 29 25  
R2 0.1485 0.0136 0.1803 0.1544   0.0554 0.2268 0.2026  
Legend: *** (**) [*] Statistically significant at 1% (5%) [10%].  
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Grey cells identify the statistically significant coefficients. All variables were logarithmized. 
Source: Own elaboration.  
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In general, the impact of FDI on inequality tends to decrease with time with elasticities 
decreasing for all periods of time, except when estimating the model using FDI inward 
flows for the Gini coefficient - between 1980s (E2) and 1990s (E3) - and Industrial 
Pay Inequality index – between 1970s (H1) and 1990s (H3). This fact is supported in 
Dabla-Norris, Kochhar, Suphaphiphat, Ricka and Tsounta (2015: 4) “Inequality trends 
have been more mixed in emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs), with 
some countries experiencing declining inequality, but pervasive inequities in access to 
education, health care, and finance remain.” 
Separating EEs by groups of income, using the baseline model (see Table 15), we 
observe that, even when we use the same proxy for income/wage inequality, FDI 
(inflows and stocks) impact distinctively on inequality depending on the income group 
we are analysing. In concrete, FDI inflows (see Model I1) and stocks (Models I1’ and 
J1’) contribute to attenuating income inequality, as proxied by the Gini index and S90-
S10/S80-S20 ratios, in lower income EEs. In sharp contrast, the stocks of FDI lead, on 
average, to an increase in income inequality (proxied by the Gini index) for richer EEs, 
most notably lower-middle-income (Model I2’), upper-middle-income (Model I3’), 
and high-income (Model I4’) countries. When using S90-S10 or S80-S20 ratios as 
inequality proxies, we observed that only for the group of upper-middle-income EEs 
(Models J3’ and L3’), the stocks of FDI produce a statistically significant impact on 
inequality, increasing it. There is not enough evidence to support the content that, for 
any group of EEs, FDI inflows impact significantly on EEs’ ratios of top versus low 
income earners.  
Again, the picture change completely when we refer to wage inequality (that is, the IPI 
index). Regardless the country’s income group, those EEs that received higher inflows 
or present higher stocks of FDI tend to observe higher wage inequality.  
Moreover, that impact is larger for upper-middle-income EEs (in the case of FDI 
inflows – see Models M1-M4) and high-income EEs (for FDI stocks – see Models 
M2’-M4’). Taking these results into consideration, there is a contradiction with 
Lessman (2013) results, who claims the higher the level of economic development the 
lower the effect of FDI on (regional) inequality. 
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Table 15: Determinants of wage inequality (panel fixed effects, robust estimations), by income groups, 1970-2015  
 Gini Coefficient 
 Model  
I1 
Low  
I2 
Lower 
Middle 
I3 
Upper 
Middle 
I4 
High 
I1’ 
Low 
I2’ 
Lower 
Middle 
I3’ 
Upper 
Middle 
I4’ 
High 
F
D
I 
FDI inward 
flows 
-0.0107*** 0.0183** 0.0052 -0.0046     
(0.0023) (0.0078) (0.0100) (0.0105)     
FDI stocks  
    -0.0056** 0.0357** 0.0213*** 0.0288* 
    (0.0027) (0.0170) (0.0082) (0.0169) 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
a
r
ia
b
le
s 
Openness 
0.0208* 0.0517** 0.0173 0.0862* 0.0279 0.0318 0.0523 0.0180 
(0.0124) (0.0233) (0.0728) (0.0457) (0.0175) (0.0267) (0.0902) (0.0648) 
GDP per capita 
0.0814 0.0194 0.0938 0.0177 0.0462 0.0244 0.0566 -0.0014 
(0.0542) (0.0315) (0.0728) (0.0660) (0.0624) (0.0440) (0.0792) (0.0602) 
            
Nº of observations 56 323 337 127 58 311 324 128 
Nº of countries 4 13 16 5 4 13 16 5 
R2 0.2342 0.2730 0.1333 0.1839 0.0562 0.3177 0.1969 0.2880 
 S90-S10 Ratio 
 Model  
J1 
Low  
J2 
Lower 
Middle 
J3 
Upper 
Middle 
J4 
High 
J1’ 
Low 
J2’ 
Lower 
Middle 
J3’ 
Upper 
Middle 
J4’ 
High 
F
D
I 
FDI inward 
flows (% GDP) 
0.0048 0.0437 0.0165 -0.0088     
(0.0050) (0.0306) (0.0472) (0.0163)     
FDI stocks (% 
GDP)  
    -0.0292* -0.1452 0.1197** 0.0558 
    (0.0162) (0.1200) (0.0586) (0.1067) 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
a
r
ia
b
le
s 
Openness 
-0.1356 0.2988* -0.0882 0.2833** -0.3619 0.5636*** -0.1200 0.1456 
(0.2333) (0.1665) (0.2149) (0.1178) (0.4426) (0.1455) (0.2574) (0.1272) 
GDP per capita 
0.2037 -0.1854 -0.1682 0.0378 0.4164 0.0007 -0.3855* 0.0279 
(0.1470) (0.1887) (0.1825) (0.2223) (0.03640) (0.1889) (0.2130) (0.2827) 
            
Nº of observations 14 84 183 83 15 84 179 84 
Nº of countries 3 13 16 5 3 13 16 5 
R2 0.1490 0.1632 0.0277 0.1458 0.1439 0.2113 0.0897 0.1429 
 S80-S20 Ratio 
 Model  
L1 
Low  
L2 
Lower 
Middle 
L3 
Upper 
Middle 
L4 
High 
L1’ 
Low 
L2’ 
Lower 
Middle 
L3’ 
Upper 
Middle 
L4’ 
High 
F
D
I 
FDI inward 
flows (% GDP) 
0.0060 0.0306 0.0089 0.0007     
(0.0037) (0.0230) (0.0361) (0.0168)     
FDI stocks (% 
GDP)  
    -0.0266 -0.1340 0.0867** 0.0709 
    (0.0167) (0.0931) (0.0425) (0.0677) 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
a
r
ia
b
le
s 
Openness 
-0.1090 0.2369* -0.0853 0.2254** -0.3410 0.4565*** -0.1057 0.0917 
(0.1988) (0.1280) (0.1597) (0.1024) (0.4196) (0.1186) (0.1948) (0.1121) 
GDP per capita 
0.1462 -0.1395 -0.1346 -0.0151 0.3566 0.0157 -0.2990* -0.0510 
(0.1294) (0.1503) (0.1336) (0.1821) (0.3562) (0.1462) (0.1634) (0.2092) 
            
Nº of observations 14 84 183 83 15 84 179 84 
Nº of countries 3 13 16 5 3 13 16 5 
R2 0.1756 0.1582 0.0517 0.1292 0.1753 0.2305 0.1383 0.1530 
 Industrial Pay Inequality Index 
 Model  
M1 
Low  
M2 
Lower 
Middle 
M3 
Upper 
Middle 
M4 
High 
M1’ 
Low 
M2’ 
Lower 
Middle 
M3’ 
Upper 
Middle 
M4’ 
High 
F
D
I 
FDI inward 
flows (% GDP) 
0.0260*** 0.0753** 0.1861*** 0.1269***     
(0.0102) (0.0303) (0.0259) (0.0464)     
FDI stocks (% 
GDP)  
    -0.1977 0.2522* 0.2312*** 0.2957*** 
    (0.1260) (0.1384) (0.0613) (0.0231) 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
a
r
ia
b
le
s 
Openness 
0.5302 0.1406** 0.2878 0.5241** 0.2024 0.0047 0.4209 -0.0093 
(0.5524) (0.0609) (0.2177) (0.2184) (0.3408) (0.1180) (0.4205) (0.3050) 
GDP per capita 
1.554 -0.1246 0.1212 0.1991 2.172 -0.3117 0.2052 0.1061 
(1.124) (0.2034) (0.4231) (0.2811) (1.385) (0.3664) (0.3263) (0.2737) 
            
Nº of observations 29 229 217 107 32 178 184 98 
Nº of countries 3 12 12 5 3 12 12 5 
R2 0.3848 0.1016 0.3598 0.4377 0.1679 0.1489 0.3520 0.4898 
Legend: *** (**) [*] Statistically significant at 1% (5%) [10%].  
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Grey cells identify the statistically significant coefficients. All variables were 
logarithmized. 
Source: Own elaboration.  
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Finally, estimates by world region (Table 16) suggest that FDI increases inequality in 
European and Asian EEs, proxied by the Gini coefficient, with FDI inflows influencing 
positively inequality in East Asian and Pacific EEs as well as for South Asian EEs 
(Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka), and FDI stocks increasing inequality in European 
and Central Asia EEs. 
As for income earners gap, FDI inflows increase inequality (proxied by the S90-S10 
and S80-S20 ratios) in Latin America and Caribbean (Chile, Colombia, Dominican 
Republic, Peru and Uruguay), and FDI stocks have the same impact in Europe and 
Central Asia for the S90-S10 ratio and in Latin America and Caribbean for the S80-
S20 ratio. In Figure 6 and 8, in Section 3.2.1., both ratios (S90-S10 and S80-S20) 
showed higher levels of inequality for Latin America and Caribbean EEs. The opposite 
effect is observed in East Asia, Pacific and South Asia, with FDI stocks decreasing 
inequality. 
When using the wage inequality proxy (IPI index), FDI (inflows and stocks) have a 
significant and positive impact in all regions with available data (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q2’ and 
Q3’), except for East Asia, Pacific and South Asia (Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka - 
Q1’). Latin America and Caribbean (Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Peru and 
Uruguay) show the highest elasticity of all our estimations, with 1% increase of FDI 
stocks leading to, all else constant, a 0.54% increase inequality. 
African EEs, have not enough data for their models to be estimated (S90-S10 ratio, 
S80-S20 ratio and IPI index) and not to be significant when estimating the model using 
the Gini proxy for inequality. 
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Table 16: Determinants of wage inequality (panel fixed effects, robust estimations), by world region, 1970-2015  
 Gini Coefficient 
 Model  
N1 
East Asia & 
Pacific +South 
Asia  
N2 
Europe & 
Central Asia  
N3 
Latin America 
& Caribbean  
N4 
Middle East & 
North Africa + 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
N1’ 
East Asia & 
Pacific + South 
Asia 
N2’ 
Europe & 
Central Asia 
N3’ 
Latin America 
& Caribbean 
N4’ 
Middle East & 
North Africa + 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
F
D
I 
FDI inward 
flows 
0.0164** 0.0105 0.0047 0.0064     
(0.0074) (0.0119) (0.0076) (0.0091)     
FDI stocks  
    -0.0111 0.0288*** 0-.0012 0.0286 
    (0.0173) (0.0070) (0.0083) (0.0205) 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
a
r
ia
b
le
s 
Openness 
-0.0165 0.0021 -0.0386 0.1160*** 0.0246 00008 -0.0106 0.0660*** 
(0.0483) (0.0697) (0.0359) (0.0222) (0.0443) (0.0684) (0.0431) (0.0190) 
GDP per capita 
0.1561*** 0.0224 -0.0451 -0.0964 0.1892*** -0.0301 -0.0472* -0.0828** 
(0.0543) (0.0437) (0.0266) (0.0614) (0.0358) (0.0478) (0.0273) (0.0423) 
            
Nº of observations 252 268 156 167 239 268 144 170 
Nº of countries 9 15 5 9 9 15 5 9 
R2 0.6011 0.0302 0.1385 0.1500 0.6374 0.1867 0.1536 0.2308 
 S90-S10 Ratio 
 Model  
O1 
East Asia & 
Pacific +South 
Asia  
O2 
Europe & 
Central Asia  
O3 
Latin America 
& Caribbean  
O4 
Middle East & 
North Africa + 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
O1’ 
East Asia & 
Pacific + South 
Asia  
O2’ 
Europe & 
Central Asia  
O3’ 
Latin America 
& Caribbean  
O4’ 
Middle East & 
North Africa + 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
F
D
I 
FDI inward 
flows (% GDP) 
-0.0218 -0.0302 0.1168***      
(0.0234) (0.0393) (0.0352)      
FDI stocks (% 
GDP)  
    -0.2235*** 0.0845* 0.1406  
    (0.0574) (0.0521) (0.0882)  
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
a
r
ia
b
le
s 
Openness 
0.2661** 0.1838 -0.0386  0.4421*** 0.1052 0.0570  
(0.1246) (0.2432) (0.0775)  (0.0609) (0.2706) (0.1689)  
GDP per capita 
-0.2710* 0.0089 -0.7173***  -0.0282 -0.1300 -0.7728***  
(0.1415) (0.1722) (0.1151)  (0.1442) (0.2008) (0.2382)  
            
Nº of observations 49 171 92 No obs. 48 171 89 No obs. 
Nº of countries 6 15 5  6 15 5  
R2 0.1468 0.0230 0.1866  0.3162 0.0659 0.1294  
 S80-S20 Ratio 
 Model  
P1 
East Asia & 
Pacific +South 
Asia  
P2 
Europe & 
Central Asia  
P3 
Latin America 
& Caribbean  
P4 
Middle East & 
North Africa + 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
P1’ 
East Asia & 
Pacific + South 
Asia  
P2’ 
Europe & 
Central Asia  
P3’ 
Latin America 
& Caribbean  
P4’ 
Middle East & 
North Africa + 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
F
D
I 
FDI inward 
flows (% GDP) 
-0.0140 -0.0290 0.0884***      
(0.0222) (0.0310) (0.0174)      
FDI stocks (% 
GDP)  
    -0.1752*** 0.0582 0.1438**  
    (0.0457) (0.0381) (0.0705)  
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
a
r
ia
b
le
s 
Openness 
0.2212** 0.1219 -0.0046  0.3593*** 0.0638 0.0595  
(0.1000) (0.1831) (0.0332)  (0.0475) (0.2052) (0.1329)  
GDP per capita 
-0.2424** -0.0215 -0.5215***  -0.0558 -0.1214 -0.6426***  
(0.1172) (0.1283) (0.0380)  (0.1196) (0.1523) (0.1829)  
            
Nº of observations 49 171 92 No obs. 48 171 89 No obs. 
Nº of countries 6 15 5  6 15 5  
R2 0.1706 0.0279 0.3592  0.3265 0.0566 0.2936  
 Industrial Pay Inequality Index 
 Model  
Q1 
East Asia & 
Pacific +South 
Asia  
Q2 
Europe & 
Central Asia  
Q3 
Latin America 
& Caribbean  
Q4 
Middle East & 
North Africa + 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Q1’ 
East Asia & 
Pacific + South 
Asia  
Q2’ 
Europe & 
Central Asia  
Q3’ 
Latin America 
& Caribbean  
Q4’ 
Middle East & 
North Africa + 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
F
D
I 
FDI inward 
flows (% GDP) 
0.1272*** 0.1971*** 0.1527**      
(0.0343) (0.0150) (0.0655)      
FDI stocks (% 
GDP)  
    -0.0951 0.2191*** 0.5470*  
    (0.2636) (0.0545) (0.3370)  
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
a
r
ia
b
le
s 
Openness 
-0.0617 0.3726* 0.5671***  0.2067 0.5988 -0.1620  
(0.4235) (0.1965) (0.2084)  (0.2538) (0.3997) (0.4027)  
GDP per capita 
0.2367 0.1862 0.1259  0.7270 -0.1539 0.3071  
(0.5314) (0.3263) (0.3154)  (0.4690) (0.3009) (0.2822)  
            
Nº of observations 106 160 132 No obs. 81 151 107 No obs. 
Nº of countries 6 10 5  6 10 5  
R2 0.1841 0.4078 0.3828  0.3041 0.3473 0.4605  
Legend: *** (**) [*] Statistically significant at 1% (5%) [10%].  
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Grey cells identify the statistically significant coefficients. All variables were logarithmized. 
Source: Own elaboration.
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5. Conclusions 
Main contributions 
Through fixed-effect panel estimations based on 39 Emerging Economies (EEs) over a 
period of 45 years (1970-2015), the present dissertation intended to comprehend the 
impact of FDI on wage inequality. 
In a global overview, the present study is novel for three main reasons. First, for the best 
of our knowledge, it is the first empirical study on the impact of FDI on wage inequality 
of a wide set (39) of EEs. Second, it compares four different macro-level measures of 
wage inequality (Gini coefficient, S90-S10 ratio, S80-S20 ratio and Industrial Pay 
Inequality index) combined with two measures of FDI (inward flows and stocks), 
controlling for GDP pc, openness, human capital and corruption and such approach has 
not been encountered by us in literature. Finally, estimating separately by time, income 
and location groups was, to what we could observe from literature, the first attempt of 
this kind to analyse the heterogeneity of EEs in what regards the impact of FDI on wage 
inequality. 
Looking closely to the results of this study, they suggest that FDI, in general, increases 
wage inequality in EEs, which can also be evident in a major set of studies such as Aitken 
et al. (1996) for the case of Mexico and Venezuela, Feenstra and Hanson (1997) for 
Mexico only, Gopinath and Chen (2003) for developing economies, Dreher and Gaston 
(2008) for OECD countries, Figini and Gorg (2011) for developing economies, and 
Bigsten and Munshi (2014) for lower income OECD countries. On the other side, it is 
also evident in our study that, in general, FDI reduces the gap between highest and lowest 
income earners in the last two decades. 
In a longitudinal overview, it was possible to conclude that the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s 
decades were periods where FDI led to increasing wage inequality in all EEs (proxied by 
the Gini and IPI measures). Notwithstanding, in the pre-world crisis period, 2000-2007, 
FDI decreased the gap between top and bottom income earners.  
It is also a relevant outcome of this study the evidence that FDI increases inequality in a 
decreasing rate over time, as in Figini and Gorg (2011), leading us to conclude that the 
markets are adjusting to foreign wage premium as well as governments are acting on it, 
by increasing expenditure in education, distributive taxing system, etc. These results go 
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in line with Author’s (2014) theory, there are main forces of supply and demand in play 
in reducing college skill premium that combined with increasing education incentives lead 
to decreasing inequality.  
Our results further evidence that, in lower income EEs, FDI decreases wage inequality 
(as proxied by the Gini) and reduces the gap between the income earners. On the other 
side, FDI stocks increase wage inequality (proxied by the Gini) in all other groups of 
income and increases the gap between income earners in higher-medium-income EEs. 
When observing wages (proxied by the IPI index), FDI increases inequality for all EEs, 
being the effect larger in higher income EEs (i.e., upper-middle and higher-income EEs). 
Finally, FDI shows a greater impact on inequality measured through wages based 
indicators (IPI index) than on income based indicators (Gini, S90-S10 and S80-S20), with 
elasticities being greater (around 10% superior) for wage inequality, as shown in Dreher 
and Gaston (2008) and commented in Dabla-Norris et al. (2015). 
 
Policy implications 
Equality is a major value for most societies (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015) and nowadays 
creating awareness for the lack of equality in its various forms (opportunity, gender, race, 
income, wages, etc.) has been a priority for many world organizations, such has the 
OECD, IMF, World Bank and UN. “Reduce inequality within and among countries” is 
even one of the 17 goals of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda for the United 
Nations. Inequality is proven to affect lower income shares of societies and, in general, 
leads to lower economic growth (OECD, 2015) in the medium-term (5 years) (Dabla-
Norris et al., 2015) 
Globalization and its instruments, foreign direct investment, trade and others, used to 
have a negative view in society, but from 1970s onwards, this perspective has changed. 
Nowadays, it is seen as positive in almost all countries, as, in general, FDI is related to 
increasing economic growth (Te Velde, 2006; Dabla-Norris et al., 2015). 
The relation between FDI and equality (or the lack of it) is not, though, a clear one. When 
many authors tried to understand it, at a first glance the answer was in general that FDI 
leads to increasing inequality. However, the relation between the globalization and 
inequality is not a direct one: FDI brings technology shifts between countries, changes in 
labour market institutions, increasing market competitiveness, and shifts in market 
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dynamics Helpman (2016). Also, foreign-owned firms are proven to hire more skilled 
labour, increasing wages for skilled workers, widening the gap in society, but not 
necessary harming the economy. In fact, “some degree of inequality may not be a problem 
insofar as it provides the incentives for people to excel, compete, save, and invest to move 
ahead in life” (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015:6).  
With our empirical study, this relation showed that FDI has a positive impact not only in 
reducing inequality (proxied by the Gini) in the low-income EEs but also decreasing the 
gap between top and low-income earners in all EEs. On the opposite side, FDI increases 
inequality (proxied by Gini coefficient and IPI index) in higher-income EEs. This leads 
us to conclude that, by reducing the gap between top and low-income earners, FDI has a 
redistributive role in society, being this positive for the economies, but there should be 
different approaches on establishing policies that control the relation between FDI and 
wage inequality, depending on each country’s development level. 
Governments of lower-income EEs should have, as their main priority, to implement 
policies to attract FDI to their countries, and governments of higher-income EEs should 
take measures to monitor and control FDI activities in their countries. This is because our 
evidence shows that FDI increases wage inequality in the higher-income EEs, and this 
result combined with the fact that this effect is decreasing over time leads us to assume 
the possibility that the emerging markets are adjusting to the changes in wages brought 
by globalization (Autor, 2014). There might be a positive side of FDI in higher-income 
EEs associated with increasing competitiveness: FDI brings higher-skilled jobs to these 
economies, which pay higher wages. Then, economies converge and adjust to these 
changes, increasing overall wages, skilled and unskilled, which enable a decrease in wage 
inequality overtime, creating an overall positive effect in society. 
We believe that this market adjustment towards more equal economies might be 
accelerated using government policies to help creating some form of guided path 
regarding the type of FDI entering in each country. EEs’ governments, especially higher-
income EEs, should be concerned with attracting FDI that goes in line with the technology 
goals of the country, so that, by aligning all the forces in play it will help decrease 
inequality. So, by developing local institutions to monitor the technology brought by 
foreign firms (Atkinson, 2015) and their wage levels, will certainly be a powerful tool to 
create more efficient policies in terms of FDI attraction and overall wages (e.g. tax 
incentives, minimum wage, etc.), specifically designed for each country’s reality in terms 
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of inequality. Monitoring technology will also help establish a more concrete education 
plan, designed to meet the country the needs, reducing the gap in skills between workers. 
Another important policy in our perspective, now in a worldwide view, is to join the 
forces of the inequality projects created worldwide (University of Texas Inequality 
Project, The London School of Economics International Inequalities Institute, etc.), and 
create a sort of global inequality observatory that will help every government, and its 
local institutions, to measure more efficiently the impact of inequality in societies and its 
various causes (including FDI), advising all governments in measures to implement to 
reduce inequality. This measure will benefit especially governments of developing 
economies, including EEs that have lower resources than developed economies 
governments.  
Summing up, it is important to use FDI strategically for each country reality. Whether in 
lower-income EEs, the main policy should be attracting FDI, in all EEs, and especially 
higher-income EEs, it is relevant to create instruments to use FDI as a tool to reduce wage 
inequality in the long run, and this way improve the economic growth of EEs, helping 
them achieve more developed levels, reduce wage inequality and creating an overall 
advancement in quality of life in every country. 
 
Limitations and paths for future research 
In this type of studies, especially when using macro-level approaches, various limitations 
in terms of data collection are preeminent, with special focus on solely wages indicators. 
Although the development of the Industrial Pay Inequality index, as we call it, but also 
known as UTIP-UNIDO index, by the University of Texas Inequality Project, was a major 
breakthrough for future empirical study on this subject, this data is limited to industrial 
inequality and available until 2008. It would be important to unite all major efforts in the 
study of inequality and extend the width of this measures, allowing to have a more precise 
understand of wage inequality. 
Also, controlling for other market-specific variables has proven to be complicated due to 
the fact of reduced and doubly reliable macro-level indicators. For example, controlling 
for human capital, the “Barro-Lee: Average years of schooling” was the broadest 
indicator we have found for our sample, but still data is only available every 5-years, 
being the remaining years estimated based on growth rates. Improving data availability 
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will surely help in understanding how other factors may imply in the inequality 
phenomenon, namely technology, labour market frictions as observable and unobservable 
firms’ and workers’ characteristics, etc., (Helpman, 2016), as well as help developing 
more precise tools for governments to realize the magnitude wage inequality and develop 
policies more direct to this problem. 
As this study is restricted to EEs, we also find relevant to enlarge the present analysis to 
a full panel of countries, analysing the impact by groups of income/development, time 
series, regions, adding trade agreements and other group of countries’ specific 
characteristics (e.g. population levels, economic stability, etc.). 
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Appendix 
 
Table 17: Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for the baseline model 
A1 A1' 
Variable VIF 1/VIF Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Openness 1.39 0.719614 Openness 1.26 0.790667 
FDI inflows 1.36 0.736904 FDI stocks 1.25 0.799833 
GDP pc 1.14 0.879450 GDP pc 1.13 0.882861 
Mean VIF 1.29  Mean VIF 1.22  
  
B1 B1' 
Variable VIF 1/VIF Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Openness 1.25 0.802683 Openness 1.29 0.775470 
FDI inflows 1.17 0.854103 FDI stocks 1.17 0.852435 
GDP pc 1.09 0.917617 GDP pc 1.14 0.877945 
Mean VIF 1.17  Mean VIF 1.20  
  
C1 C1' 
Variable VIF 1/VIF Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Openness 1.25 0.802683 Openness 1.29 0.775470 
FDI inflows 1.17 0.854103 FDI stocks 1.17 0.852435 
GDP pc 1.09 0.917617 GDP pc 1.14 0.877945 
Mean VIF 1.17  Mean VIF 1.20  
  
D1 D1' 
Variable VIF 1/VIF Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Openness 1.55 0.643859 Openness 1.37 0.727498 
FDI inflows 1.50 0.667202 FDI stocks 1.35 0.738130 
GDP pc 1.29 0.776474 GDP pc 1.34 0.745287 
Mean VIF 1.45  Mean VIF 1.36  
Source: Own elaboration.  
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 Table 18: Correlation matrix of the variables in the baseline model 
Source: Own elaboration.  
 
A1 A1’ 
 Gini 
Coef. 
FDI 
inflows 
Openness 
GDP 
pc 
 Gini 
Coef. 
FDI 
inflows 
Openness 
GDP 
pc 
Gini Coef. 1    Gini Coef. 1    
FDI 
inflows 
0.0852 1   
FDI 
stocks 
0.2537 1   
Openness -0.2422 0.4962 1  Openness -0.2466 0.4170 1  
GDP pc -0.0142 0.2806 0.3168 1 GDP pc -0.0256 0.2758 0.2969 1 
  
B1 B1’ 
 Gini 
Coef. 
FDI 
inflows 
Openness 
GDP 
pc 
 Gini 
Coef. 
FDI 
inflows 
Openness 
GDP 
pc 
Gini Coef. 1    
Gini 
Coef. 
1    
FDI 
inflows 
-0.0086 1   
FDI 
stocks 
0.0566 1   
Openness -0.4561 0.3797 1  Openness -0.4397 0.3808 1  
GDP pc 0.0795 0.2838 0.1472 1 GDP pc 0.0863 0.3456 0.1790 1 
  
C1 C1’ 
 Gini 
Coef. 
FDI 
inflows 
Openness 
GDP 
pc 
 Gini 
Coef. 
FDI 
inflows 
Openness 
GDP 
pc 
Gini Coef. 1    
Gini 
Coef. 
1    
FDI 
inflows 
-0.0181 1   
FDI 
stocks 
0.0488 1   
Openness -0.4662 0.3797 1  Openness -0.4507 0.3808 1  
GDP pc 0.0626 0.2838 0.1472 1 GDP pc 0.0681 0.3456 0.1790 1 
  
D1 D1’ 
 Gini 
Coef. 
FDI 
inflows 
Openness 
GDP 
pc 
 Gini 
Coef. 
FDI 
inflows 
Openness 
GDP 
pc 
Gini Coef. 1    
Gini 
Coef. 
1    
FDI 
inflows 
0.2650 1   
FDI 
stocks 
0.3478 1   
Openness 0.1191 0.5491 1  Openness 0.0772 0.4445 1  
GDP pc -0.093 0.3970 0.4325 1 GDP pc -0.0873 0.4219 0.4357 1 
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Table 19: Other diagnosis tests of our baseline model 
 
Source: Own elaboration.  
 
 
  A1 A1' B1 B1' C1 C1' D1 D1' 
 Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Test 0.0085 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0013 0.0001 0.6151 0.0000 
Homoscedasticity 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg (iid) Test 0.0097 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 0.0000 0.7770 0.0073 
 White’s Test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
 Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Endogeneity Hausman 0.0000 0.0000 0.0612 0.0625 0.0122 0.0040 0.0043 0.0074 
